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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

NATO: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE
The Atlantic Alliance as an Institution, Organization and
Force by Reference to Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the
Washington Treaty

by

Spyros Branikas

December 2004

Thesis Co-Advisors:

Daniel J. Moran
Donald Abenheim

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**NATO: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE
The Atlantic Alliance as an Institution, Organization and Force by
Reference to Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the evolution of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as an institution in the International System by reference to Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty of 1949. Initially, the thesis considers NATO from an international relations perspective. It then proceeds to examine the institutional evolutionary process of the Alliance since its inception and implementation in 1949. Furthermore, it explores the significance and the meaning of the aforementioned Articles. This thesis utilizes the case study method and refers to four distinct events that have shaped allied policies and strategies: the Suez Crisis of 1956, the establishment of the politico-military consultation process, the Yom Kippur War (1973), and the end of the Cold War (1989-1991). It also examines the allied policies after the events of September 11, 2001. Moreover, it identifies a general pattern of events pertinent to crisis creation inside NATO when the organization is facing a defense issue outside the Euro-Atlantic area. Finally, the thesis concludes that NATO is more than an ordinary military Alliance, as advocated by its longevity, agility and adaptability, which allows the Alliance to maintain a central position in the International System as a robust politico-military organization.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. OVERVIEW

This thesis analyzes the institutional evolution of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) by examining Articles 4, 5 and 6 of its Treaty, as well as, NATO's role in the International System. Notwithstanding the importance of all the Articles of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, and their equal importance in their own right, Articles 4, 5, and 6 present a challenge to be examined for the following reasons:

- Article 5 (collective defense) is the fundamental article of the treaty, the crux of the Alliance, as it provides the fundamental pledge of the Alliance to support collective defense for its member states.
- Article 4 (consultation) is the basis used in the internal processes and deliberations of the Alliance to readjust and reorient its policies and strategies. It also provides the vehicle by which the Alliance evolves, based on established norms of cooperation among democracies, even when the disparity between the United States (U.S.) and the other members remain a tangible fact.
- Article 6 (geographical area) is important for the contemporary evolution of the Alliance because it defines the geographical area within which the provisions of Article 5 apply. This is an issue in which the Alliance has been interested since its inception; however, Cold War preoccupations overshadowed it.

NATO, besides being a military alliance based on mutual collective defense pledges among its member states, is a complex political organization and as such has to adapt to the changes of international politics by transforming its roles, policies and strategies.

Since its inception and implementation, the Washington Treaty has been the major document for the Alliance. It has been supplemented by several

significant documents like, the report of the 1956 committee of the “three Wise Men”, the 1967 Harmel report, and the Strategic Concepts of 1991 and 1999. The ability of the Alliance to generate policies which adapts and/or transform its strategy represents the adaptive and agile behavior of NATO to withstand changes in international politics.

B. MAIN QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENTS

The main question of this thesis is how the Atlantic Alliance has evolved, from the perspective of Articles 4, 5 and 6, to assume the new roles in the strategic landscape of the International System. The thesis will suggest that NATO remains a collective defense organization, a principal political and military instrument, which affirms the evident connection between the member states on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.

The main argument of the thesis is that NATO, despite the fears to the contrary, has proven to be a strong alliance which, through its institutional evolution, has managed to withstand major external strains. Moreover, by continuing to demonstrate such adaptive and agile behavior, the Alliance will withstand future crises. This is of particular importance in contemporary times as NATO is an active player in the Global War on Terror. The major source of the Alliance’s agility is provided by the strength that emanates from the Treaty governing NATO and binding its member states. Furthermore, this thesis will provide evidence to support the argument that NATO, as an institution, remains central to the International System due to the fundamental cohesion provided by Article 5, which, through Article 6, binds the Euro-Atlantic area. Moreover, the thesis will examine the power of cooperation embodied in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and will spotlight the internal functions that have been developed within the Alliance.

The thesis will conclude by arguing that NATO remains a vital actor in the international scene capable of undertaking political initiatives, combined with

military action, to promote stability.¹ Despite occasional crises and internal disagreements, NATO, as an institution, remains strong and relevant in the modern era. It is still serving the Allied interests, as has always been the case, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

Wherever possible the research will exploit primary sources. A number of these derive from the documents found in the volumes of the U.S. Foreign Relations and NATO's declassified documents and studies. In addition, the thesis will conduct an analysis of pertinent events and their implications for the Alliance, by citing relevant primary sources such as telegrams exchanged between the U.S. Mission to NATO and the Department of State.

Moreover, the thesis will utilize suitable secondary sources as appropriate. Historical resources, based on declassified documents, will provide the necessary material of research. Numerous sources containing reports of pertinent events will be utilized, such as archives, newspaper Articles, specialized magazines, and journals.

The evolution of NATO, and in particular, Articles 4, 5, and 6 of the Washington Treaty, will be examined by use of case studies to exploit the advantages provided by historical hindsight. By utilizing the case study method, this thesis will attempt to derive a conclusive general pattern pertinent to the evolution of the Articles in question and determine how NATO has been consolidated in to the International System.

The thesis will examine the evolution of the Alliance in relation to the aforementioned Articles by analyzing the following events:

¹ NATO was conceived as a regional defense organization in the context of the United Nations Charter. However, it plausible to argue that NATO is transforming to become a global reach Alliance to promote political stability wherever the Allies deem necessary.

- The establishment and development of the politico-military consultation processes and norms inside the Alliance (1948-1956). During the early years, a set of comprehensive studies was conducted that proved the necessity for politico-military consultation and its diachronism. These studies provide the necessary premise for cooperation among member states.
- The Suez crisis of 1956 which provides historical evidence of the ramifications resulting from lack of consultation between the Allied nations.
- The Arab-Israeli War of October 1973 (The Yom Kippur war) and the Defensive Condition Three (DEFCON III) promulgation of the U.S. strategic and conventional forces worldwide, which provide a sort of symmetrical image of the Suez crisis.
- The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War (1988-1991). While the prime enemy evaporated NATO remained in place despite speculations heralding its dissolution. Moreover the Alliance adapted to the new strategic environment and by adopting new policies, managed to withstand the external vibrations of that period.

The aforementioned events are cited because they represent major milestones in the evolution of the Alliance. These events led NATO to pursue cooperation in more elaborate ways and fostered development of cooperative strategies and techniques between the Allies. The case study methodology is utilized as it provides an adequate survey of historical events. Moreover, the thesis will attempt to place pertinent events in their appropriate context. In other words, by using four cases studies, this thesis will try not to proliferate further the abundant bibliography that already exists, but will provide a critical view of the events and the diversity of policies that followed. Furthermore, the thesis will attempt to explore the existence of a pattern that leads the Alliance to a potential

crisis situation in relation to the aforementioned Articles. Moreover the study will examine the departure points after such events that initiate a set of actions to readjust allied policies.

Last but not least, the thesis will examine NATO's reaction towards the novel strategic landscape stemming from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States. Furthermore, besides the horrific events, Allied solidarity was expressed in the most palpable manner by the Allied invocation of Article 5.

D. CHAPTER BY CHAPTER SUMMARY

Chapter II will provide a brief examination of the Alliance in the context of International Relations theory. The aforementioned Articles will be scrutinized to extract their deeper meanings and their role in the shaping of Allied strategies and policies. This chapter will also provide an analysis of each individual article. Relevant principal strategic documents of the Alliance, as well as historic events and their repercussions, will be examined to elaborate the study further

Chapter III will present a survey of NATO's evolution as an institution over its life span, by examining four distinct case studies. Furthermore, it will present allied strategies and policies as they were formulated through the interaction of the Alliance with its external environment. The four case studies will be used to unfold NATO's evolution through major historic events that will be utilized and cited for this purpose.

Chapter IV will discuss the study of the events from 1999 to present as they relate to NATO. It will show this period is marked by a major historic event pertinent to the Alliance and its core concept, the collective defense pledge. The invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty after the attacks of September 11, 2001, present, in its own right, a major political event. The Alliance fulfilled its most basic and fundamental duty; to provide collective defense guarantees and the necessary actions to support them in the case of an external attack to one of

the Allies. Furthermore, this chapter will show that during this era the Alliance assumed an active role outside the core transatlantic region, as articulated in Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Chapter V will conclude with the assertion that in contemporary times NATO remains the only multinational, integrated, and institutionalized alliance that can operate, as and where deemed necessary by the member nations. Moreover, this chapter will also show that the Alliance is a politico-military forum where Allies are able to cooperate to reach common decisions based on consensus, through an elaborate mechanism that allows the convergence of differing views.

II. NATO IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS CONTEXT ALLIANCE THEORY AND THE ESSENCE OF ARTICLES 4, 5 AND 6 OF THE WASHINGTON TREATY OF 1949

A. NATO UNDER THE ALLIANCE THEORY PERSPECTIVE

Alliance theory is considered “one of the most underdeveloped areas ...”² of international relations theory. The two schools of thought that dominate this field are referred to as neorealism³ and institutionalism. This part of the chapter will address the issue of NATO’s enduring existence, from an alliance theory perspective, despite the collapse of the *causa causans* that spurred its birth. In other words, it will address the questions, why has NATO outlived its primordial enemy, the former Soviet Empire, and why did it not dissolve with the latter’s collapse.

1. Realism

Realism considers power to be the dominant force that states seek in order to ensure their existence in an anarchical world system where there is “unregulated competition of states.”⁴ For realists, cooperation among states exists “in order to balance against the greatest threat(s) they face....”⁵ As Walt points out, “...offensive alliances are generally more fragile than defensive ones.”⁶

² Glenn H. Snyder, “Alliances, Balance, and Stability - The Origins of Alliances by Stephen M. Walt The Balance of Power: Stability in International Systems by Emerson M. S. Niu, Peter C. Ordeshook and Gregory F. Rose,” *International Organization*, 45 Winter (1991) as cited in Robert B. McCalla, “NATO’s persistence after the Cold War,” *International Organization*, 50 Summer (1996): 445.

³ Derived form realism which is described in the seminal works of H. J. Morgenthau (*Politics Among Nations*) and E. H. Carr (*The Twenty Years Crisis 1919 – 1939*), neorealism’s most prominent representative is Kenneth Waltz.

⁴ Robert O. Keohane, *Neorealism and its critics, The Political economy of international change* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).

⁵ Stephen M. Walt, “Why alliances endure or collapse,” *Survival*, 39 Spring (1997): 158.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 159.

Thus, an alliance of defensive nature, such as NATO,⁷ is more resistant to external pressures, including the elimination of a prime enemy. For the realist and neorealist schools of thought, international organizations or regimes “exist to bolster or protect the power of the hegemon or primary powers.”⁸ At the same time, realist theories reveal their weaknesses when they are called to explain how smaller states influence the decisions of a leader ally.⁹

Because NATO is considered, in these terms, to be a “deviant case”¹⁰, a more elaborate approach to the reasons that have led to its persistence is useful. In particular, a reverse argument can be applied to Walt’s rationale. According to Walt, “[a]lliances are most commonly regarded as a response to an external threat”¹¹, and moreover, “[t]he most obvious and important cause [that leads Alliances to deteriorate and dissolve] is change in the identity or nature of the threat that produced the original association.”¹² In other words, because there is significant change in the “balance-of-threat,”¹³ and thus according to the pertinent theory, since the enemy, the Warsaw pact, disappeared, NATO had no perceptible reason to exist.

However, NATO did not disappear. It has remained an active actor in the international scene. While the alliance theory under the realist lens may provide

⁷ Based on the arguments projected by Stephen M. Walt, “Why alliances endure or collapse,” *Survival*, 39 Spring (1997) NATO is a defensive alliance since it was not conceived “... to provide the means the means for an attack on some third party...” Ibid., 157. The Soviet Union and its Allies, needless to say, saw things differently.

⁸ Tom Lansford, *All for one: terrorism, NATO and the United States*, (Burlington, VT.: Ashgate, 2002), 10.

⁹ For further elaborate analysis see Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence On U.S. Foreign Policy*, Princeton studies in international history and politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), .

¹⁰ Robert B. McCalla, “NATO’s persistence after the Cold War,” *International Organization*, 50 Summer (1996): 447.

¹¹ Stephen M. Walt, “Why alliances endure or collapse,” *Survival*, 39 Spring (1997): 159.

¹² Ibid., 163.

¹³ James E. Dougherty, Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations: a Comprehensive Survey*, 4th ed. (New York: Longman, 1996), 304.

some persuasive arguments in more “classic” pre-Second World War Alliances¹⁴ or coalitions formed under coercion and intimidation, it seems to lose explanatory power in the case of NATO. What this implies is that NATO is not a simple alliance created at the behest of balance-of-power or balance-of-threat. There are additional considerations to be accounted for that that have led to NATO’s persistence. Those can be found in liberalism, institutionalism, and the related theories.

2. Liberalism, Idealism and Liberal Institutionalism

On the antipode of neorealism lay the theories of liberalism and idealism which apply mostly to “domestic politics and domestic structures...”¹⁵ Unlike realist theories, “liberal theories of international relations emphasize domestic and transnational groups of individuals affecting state interests and preferences.”¹⁶ Idealists deplore the notion of power and the preservation of balance-of-power politics, and favor instead “general democratization, national self determination, and the organization of a peaceful international order by intrinsically pacific states.”¹⁷ Such ideals were promoted by President Wilson when he deplored the balance of power system in favor of a “community of power.”¹⁸

Liberal institutionalism and regime theory, in the case of NATO, are utilized to provide explanations for the divergence of opinions expressed among the Allies. Furthermore, they account for the synthesis of ideas expressed by the Alliance. Since in democracies, parties “resolve disputes by means of dialogue,

¹⁴ Like the Romania’s alignment with the Axis powers during the Second World War etc.

¹⁵ Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence On U.S. Foreign Policy*, Princeton studies in international history and politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), 25. Furthermore, one can take into account Organizational Theory to explain NATO’s persistence.

¹⁶ Ibid., 25-26.

¹⁷ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security*, (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1997), 10.

¹⁸ Ibid., 11.

consensus, and compromise, the same norms tend to be applied to coalitions of democratic states.” Democracies externalize their internal norms when cooperating with each other.¹⁹ Moreover, the theory provides a solution for the distrust among state actors, as exemplified by the “prisoner’s dilemma.”²⁰ The prisoner’s dilemma is a scenario in which players interact “without a central authority to force them to cooperate with each other.”²¹ Institutions, according to institutional liberalism, provide a means to overcome the prisoner’s dilemma by providing a necessary framework of cooperation with established rules and norms that address the issue of constraining the participating states. In such a manner, NATO functions as a collective instrument comprised of democracies where there is tolerance for different views in its internal procedures. On the other hand, in its external relations, the Alliance exhibits resilience and functions as a resolute body of common ideas and perceptions in support of the common policies and strategies of the Allied nations.

In the case of NATO “one has to understand the dynamics of its behavior as an organization, the interplay of member interests within the security regime that surrounds NATO and the opportunities and constraints of the domestic political considerations”²²

NATO is both a security regime and an Alliance. As an Alliance, it “is a formal commitment for security cooperation”²³ among its member state. On the other hand, as a security regime, it is

[a mechanism] for aggregating the capabilities of [its member] states in situations in which individually the states have

¹⁹ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security*, (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1997), 33.

²⁰ For further elaboration on the “prisoner’s dilemma” which addresses the issue of cooperation “in world without central authority” see Robert M. Axelrod, *The evolution of cooperation*, (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

²¹ *Ibid.*, 6.

²² Robert B. McCalla, “NATO’s persistence after the Cold War,” *International Organization*, 50 Summer (1996): 446-447.

²³ Stephen M. Walt, “Why alliance endure or collapse,” *Survival*, 39 Spring (1997): 157.

inadequate capability to deal with threats that confront them. In fact, the scale required to generate the capability to assure survival often exceeds that of any one state, so that cooperation becomes necessary.²⁴

In sum, institutionalist and liberal theories provide a more satisfactory paradigm for understanding NATO's case, since the Atlantic Alliance does not fall in the category of traditional alliances that stand only for mutual defense. Furthermore, the examination of NATO's persistence, on a theoretical basis, constitutes the first evidence that NATO is more than an ordinary military alliance.

B. THE ESSENCE OF ARTICLES 4, 5 AND 6 OF THE WASHINGTON TREATY 1949²⁵

Articles 4, 5 and 6 are the foundation of the Washington Treaty since they constitute the core of the Alliance, or at least its major portion. Article 4 establishes the consultation norm among the Allies for issues pertaining to the security of the Allied nations. Moreover, it is the only article that explicitly refers explicitly to the consultation as a procedure.²⁶ Article's 4 wording compels ("will consult") the Allies to consult with their partners whenever there are considerations raised to a wide range of issues which have an impact on the Allies' such as "the territorial integrity, political independence or security." Article 5 is the collective defense clause. It constitutes the fundamental pledge of the

²⁴ Katja Weber, "Hierarchy amidst anarchy: A transaction costs approach to international security cooperation," *International Studies Quarterly*, 41 Jun (1997): 326.

²⁵ It is imperative at this point to note the importance of Articles 2, 3 and 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty by virtue of their interrelation to the Articles employed in this study. Article 2 (a.k.a. the "Canadian article") refers to the economic cooperation between the Allies and their free institutions. It emphasizes the necessity of "stability and well-being." Article 3 (self help) stipulates the axiom of self help which leads to the effective collective defense. Finally, Article 9 establishes the North Atlantic Council, the only body directly derived from the treaty. The Council is also given the power to establish "subsidiary bodies as may be necessary." Moreover the Article stipulates that the North Atlantic Council will establish "immediately a defense committee" to provide the necessary steps of implementing collective defense.

²⁶ Escott Reid, *Time of fear and hope: the making of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947-1949*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), 164.

Allies to contribute “as deemed necessary,” including “the use of armed force[s]” to the benefit of the partner(s) under threat or attack. Finally, Article 6 defines the geographic area where the force of the previous article applies. It does not, however, limit the consultation norm of Article 4. This means that if any of the Allies feel their interests are threatened in any geographic location, they can invoke Article 4, since consultation is mandatory. What follows is a more elaborate analysis of these three Articles and their impact on the policies of the Allies.

1. Article 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.²⁷

Article 4 of the Washington Treaty sets the necessary provisions of the consultation process inside NATO. It establishes the premise that the Alliance is a forum governed by the freedom of expression of ideas. It implicitly provides a stepping stone to consensus among the Allies, and provides a connection to the subsequent article, Article 5, which discusses those issues subject to consultation. The threat of territorial integrity, political independence, and security may stem from differing factors that do not explicitly touch upon issues of defense in a narrow sense, but from political, economic, or other non-military means, like trade, sanctions and so on.

Consultation is an indispensable element of the consensus building process inside the Alliance. Despite the divergent nature of the Allies in issues like culture, military and economic power, or national interest, etc., the consultation process established in Article 4 provides the necessary framework to bridge these differences and foster cooperation among the Allied nations. Since

²⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization - Office of Information and Press, *NATO Handbook*, (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), 527-530.

NATO is an alliance of democracies,²⁸ through the consultation processes, the Allies manage to overcome their differences and pursue their common interests. From the consultation process derives the intrinsic ability of every ally, either small or big, to influence the Alliance. As the Committee of the “Three Wise Men” has pointed out, “[t]he Atlantic powers already possess in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) an instrument of unity and a forum for consultation regarding policies of general interest.”²⁹

Moreover, Article 4 implicitly states that such an exchange of opinions is an obligation of the member nations towards the Alliance. The article stipulates broad notions where consultation is applied. Furthermore, the commitment of the Allies to the consultation “norm” provides the necessary basis for exchange of information among them which in turn leads to the fulfilment of the NATO’s “internal functions.” As Professor Yost points out:

Although these internal functions may be categorized and defined in various ways, at least eight have been identified: maintaining U.S. engagement in European security, resolving intra-West European security dilemmas, reassuring Germany's neighbors and Allies, limiting the scope of nuclear proliferation in NATO Europe, promoting a certain "denationalization" of defense planning, providing a forum for the coordination of Western security policies, supplying economic benefits to all the Allies, and encouraging and legitimizing democratic forms of government.³⁰

²⁸ While this is not entirely accurate since Portugal, one of the founding members of the Alliance, was not a democratic state but under the Salazar Regime. Moreover during the course of NATO’s existence military coups were established in Greece (1967) and Turkey (1960 and 1980); however, many argue that the Alliance is a promoter of democracy and has taken steps towards that direction, most notably after the changes in the European strategic environment in the post 1989 era. Furthermore, NATO in 1999 launched the Membership Action Plan (MAP) which provides certain guidelines for the countries aspiring membership, including among the former prerequisites such as democratic norms, civilian control of the military etc. For further details see North Atlantic Treaty Organization - Office of Information and Press, *NATO Handbook*, (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), 65-67, and North Atlantic Council, Membership Action Plan [Internet] (1999, accessed 9/28 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-066e.htm>.

²⁹ G. Martino, H. Lange, and L. Pearson, *Text of the Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO* (NAC Dec. 13, 1956) [Internet] (1956, accessed 9/28 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/bt-a3.htm>.

³⁰ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security*, (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1997), 50.

From the aforementioned eight functions it is deemed necessary to identify that the fifth function "...providing a forum for the coordination of Western security policies..." is directly associated with the consultation norm, as exhibited from the preceding analysis.

Moreover, one can argue that all of NATO's functions are in a more or less manner interconnected with the consultation norm and thus with each other. For example, the function of "resolving intra West European security dilemmas" could be achieved because NATO by solving the security dilemma [*inter alia*] "...in West European relations has facilitated the pursuit of economic and political cooperation a process that was deliberately urged and sponsored by the United States, building on the thought and work of Jean Monnet and other European advocates of such cooperation."³¹ Elaborating further, there are scholars and diplomats who cite the role of the U.S. in resolving intra-NATO crises. The Greco-Turkish disputes are used as a tangible example of such resolution and conflict avoidance. However, opinions diverge and are either attributed to direct U.S. intervention and mediation, by application of unilateral "U.S. pressure,"³² or as others argue, due to the NATO membership that those two nations enjoy.³³ Additionally, the consultation process provides a vehicle for all Allied nations to further promote their interdependence, by furnishing their common policies and strategies which in turn enhance allied solidarity and cohesion. It is noted that whenever, the consultation norm malfunctioned the consequences were embarrassing for the Alliance, or individual Allies, or for both.

³¹ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security*, (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1997), 51.

³² *Ibid.*, 52.

³³ Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The long entanglement: NATO's first fifty years*, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), 228.

A brief comparative analysis of NATO Allies' capability and political will to consult can be made using the Warsaw pact. The Atlantic Alliance was/is based on the premises of synthesis of different opinions. This attribute which derives from the basic values of democracy, provides the Alliance with the ability to tolerate controversial differences and diverse views, which are bridged through compromise, dialogue and consensus. In stark contrast stand out "Soviet forecasts of NATO's demise [during the 1990-91 period which] were mistaken, partly because they were based on a false parallelism (equating NATO and the Warsaw Pact)[;]... the Warsaw Pact was a Soviet-organized body founded on coercion. It was an instrument of control...NATO, in contrast...emerged from... [the] democratic nations in Europe and North America."³⁴ Moreover, the Warsaw pact dissolved since the foundation that was built upon no longer existed due to the precipitating events of the late 1980s. As Gorbachev has stated "[h]e and his comrades concluded that it was really inconceivable that anyone in the White House actually wanted to blow up the Soviet Union..."³⁵

Moreover, in both the Strategic concepts of the Alliance, the first published during the London summit of 1991,³⁶ and the second during the Washington summit of 1999,³⁷ the "golden rule of consultation" is reiterated by reference to Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. By contrasting the pertinent articles in both strategic concepts, one can observe their stunning similarity in the paragraphs referring to the consultation process.³⁸

³⁴ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security*, (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1997), 27-28.

³⁵ Robert G. Kaiser, "Gorbachev: 'We All Lost Cold War'," *The Washington Post*, 7/11/2004 2004.

³⁶ North Atlantic Council, *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept* [Internet] (NATO, 1991, accessed 9/28 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911107a.htm#I>.

³⁷ North Atlantic Council, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept* [Internet] (NAC, 4/23/1999 1999, accessed 9/28 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>.

³⁸ The only difference is the omission of the word "essential" before the expression "transatlantic forum."

Furthermore, on the plane of strategy and policy, closer examination of Article 4 reveals that it stipulates the general notion of “security” of the Allies. However, it provides no geographic restriction. In other words, while Articles 5 and 6 link the Alliance through pledges for mutual defense in a defined area, Article 4 provides the springboard for security considerations no matter where the threat is originating from.

2. Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually, and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.³⁹

The most fundamental premise revolving around the notion of every military alliance was and remains “...the undertaking of each of the Allies to come immediately to the assistance of another member of the alliance if it is subjected to an armed attack.”⁴⁰ In NATO’s case, the provision of mutual assistance is provided in Article 5. This article was and remains the core of the Alliance, since it contains pledges for the collective security of the Allies. Furthermore, the historical facts of the formation of NATO reflect the considerations of the Allies on both sides of the Atlantic, embodied in the Treaty of Washington. While Article 5

³⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization - Office of Information and Press, *NATO Handbook*, (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), 528.

⁴⁰ Escott Reid, *Time of fear and hope: the making of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947-1949*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), 143.

like the Treaty itself does not name a specific enemy, was at the time directed to counter and deter Soviet expansionism and militarization.

Moreover, the mutual defense pledges consolidated U.S. involvement in European affairs since U.S. security is inextricable with that of Europe. By virtue of the intrinsic characteristics of the article (under the notion “one for all and all for one”) the Atlantic Alliance transformed the longstanding U.S. foreign policy for Hemispheric defense, envisioned by Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR), based on the axiom that the Western Hemisphere“ was a “separate system of interests” and sanctuary of civilized values.”⁴¹ Instead, under the Soviet threat, the Atlantic became an ocean that connected the two continents in many different ways but most importantly through the mutual defense pledges of Article 5.

At this point it is essential to note that “[the U.S. pledge for assistance including military action in a quasi-automated form] was a revolutionary commitment in view of its [U.S.’s] political tradition of isolationism and [policies of] avoiding “entangling alliances” in peacetime.”⁴² In other words, the Atlantic Alliance, and particularly Article 5, curbed the “longstanding suspicions that... [the U.S.] would be made victims of European exploitation, which they perceived to have been the case from the Napoleonic wars to World War I.”⁴³ The notion to “bring the boys home” is very eloquently put in FDR’s wording to Churchill in 1944: “You know of course that after Germany’s collapse I must bring American troops home as rapidly as transportation problems will permit.”⁴⁴ Additionally, the positive conviction of American Secretary of State Dean Acheson before the Senate Committee during the deliberations to ratify the treaty, that there was no

⁴¹ John Lamberton Harper, *American Visions Of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson*, (Cambridge ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 63.

⁴² David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security*, (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1997), 29.

⁴³ Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The long entanglement: NATO’s first fifty years*, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), 3.

⁴⁴ John Lamberton Harper, *American Visions Of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson*, (Cambridge ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 117.

prospect of sending “substantial number[s] [of] troops abroad”⁴⁵ reflects the U.S. notion of avoidance of peacetime alliances. However, the vibrations caused by the politico-military expansionism of Soviet Communism made imperative the involvement of the U.S. in Europe through the Atlantic Alliance.

While Article 5 constitutes for the U.S. a major departure from the “political traditions of isolationism,”⁴⁶ for the European Allies, though it did not stipulate the automatic functions and provisions of the treaty of Brussels,⁴⁷ it ensured that the U.S. would be actively engaged in the defense of Europe against any Soviet aggression through the reassurance provided by the monopoly of atomic weapons. Moreover, it created the necessary conditions for the reintegration of Germany in the European system of states by reassuring the Allies against any German resurgence.

Furthermore, it is notable that the provisions of the Article define a “blurred” line between automatic reactions and strict undeniable commitments,

⁴⁵ Dean Acheson, *Present at the creation; my years in the State Department*, 1st ed. (New York; Norton, 1969), 285.

⁴⁶ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security*, (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1997), 29.

⁴⁷ *Yale Law School Avalon-Project*, Treaty of Economic, Social, and Cultural collaboration and Collective Self-defense (Brussels Treaty), March 17, 1948 [Internet] (Yale Law School, 10/6/2004 1998, accessed 9/28 2004); available from <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/intdip/westeu/we001.htm>. was concluded among the BENELUX countries, France and Great Britain and along with “...President Truman’s special message to the U.S. Congress requesting authorization to reinstate conscription and universal military training...” are considered as the pretext of the North Atlantic Treaty; for further study see William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth-Century World: An International History*, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 267-273.

binding the Allies in conditions that do not yet exist or could potentially exist by a minor reaction in an otherwise minor incident.⁴⁸

The North Atlantic Treaty was the centerpiece of U.S. strategy at the time it was concluded. It was intended to provide security and stability for the economic recovery of Europe, and secure it from Soviet aggression (either direct or indirect). It also contributed to the European unification, but also to the fundamental change of attitude in Europe, that had incurred two devastating World Wars, in thirty years.

In addition, even after the end of the Cold War, NATO relies on the collective defense clause that Article 5 contains, as this has been reiterated in the Alliance's strategic concept of 1999.⁴⁹ It is the essence of this Article that provides the incentives for the countries of former Eastern Europe in their aspirations to join the Alliance. Moreover, it provides perhaps the strongest commitment that a sovereign nation can make today, to commit armed forces to fight for an allied partner against an external aggressor.

3. Article 6

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

⁴⁸ During the negotiations for the conclusion of the Treaty there was an extensive debate as to how far and by what wording would the obligations of the Allies be defined in respect to the mutual contribution in an armed attack. The precedents of the recently concluded Rio Treaty (*Yale Law School Avalon-Project*, Rio De Janeiro Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, August 15- September 2, 1947 [Internet] (Yale Law School, 10/6/2004 1998, accessed 9/28 2004); available from <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decad061>) and the aforementioned Treaty of Brussels, provided the initial grounds of debate. Moreover, the U.S. JCS raised objections to the extent of Article 5 (for further details see Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The long entanglement: NATO's first fifty years*, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), 3-4, and Escott Reid, *Time of fear and hope: the making of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947-1949*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), 147-148. Finally the actual text of Article 5 was not as explicit as Article IV of the Brussels treaty on the use of armed forces; however, the provisions of the article include an iron-clad, explicit reference to the use of armed force "...as deemed necessary..." In other words, Article 5 stands out as compromise between the anxieties expressed by the Europeans on one hand, and those of the U.S. Senate as the only constitutionally mandated legislative body authorized to declare war in the U.S., on the other (for further details see *Ibid.*, 155-156).

⁴⁹ North Atlantic Council, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept* [Internet] (NAC, 4/23/1999 1999, accessed 9/28 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>.

- on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;

- on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.⁵⁰

Article 6 of the Washington Treaty stipulates the geographic area of the Article 5 commitments. It confines the Allied pledge in a well defined geographic area, but it does not bind general Allied interests geographically. In other words, while it defines the area where Article 5 is applied for the purposes of collective defense, it creates no geographic restrictions on either consultation, or protection of allied interests. One can plausibly argue that the first out-of-area issue for NATO was raised even before the Alliance acquired “flesh and bones.” The debate of whether Italy should be incorporated in the first tier of nations forming the Alliance and subsequently Greece and Turkey (to defuse further Soviet encroachment against these nations), was the first form of deliberations inside the Alliance, with relevance to the geographic area coverage of the Treaty. Finally, through a compromise, for various strategic and political reasons (domestic and foreign), the Allies extended the notion of defense of the “North Atlantic area”⁵¹ to incorporate Italy, as one of the original signatories, and subsequently after three years, Greece and Turkey, who joined the Alliance.⁵²

For NATO it was the Korean War, which led to the creation of the military structure and supportive bureaucracy,⁵³ clearly an out-of-area issue. Several

⁵⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization - Office of Information and Press, *NATO Handbook*, (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), 528.

⁵¹ Escott Reid, *Time of fear and hope: the making of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947-1949*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), 103.

⁵² For further details see *Ibid.*, 200-201, Don Cook, *Forging the alliance: NATO 1945-1950*, 1st U.S. ed. (New York: Arbor House, 1989), 214-217, Dean Acheson, *Present at the creation; my years in the State Department*, 1st ed. (New York,: Norton, 1969), 279.

⁵³ Ian Q. R. Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination*, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 29.

other cases of out-of-area considerations can also be recalled during the Cold War era, two of which (the Suez crisis of 1956, and Yom Kippur War of 1973) will be examined in a following chapter of this thesis.

“Though out-of-area concerns had been of great importance since NATO’s founding,”⁵⁴ the Alliance during the Cold War was focused on the security of Europe. The European theatre was considered the major area of confrontation. Furthermore, focus of NATO’s responsibility geographically precluded disputes among the Allies pertinent to “decolonization conflicts...and non-European engagements of the United States.”⁵⁵ While the geographic limits of NATO’s responsibility have been a contentious issue for the Allies, most out-of-area incidents during the Cold War era fell “within the national competence of those allied governments which happen[ed] or wish[ed] to be involved.”⁵⁶

However, the demise of the Soviet Union created new challenges for the Alliance in its immediate area of primary interest with the crises in former Yugoslavia. Thus, two concepts were introduced pertinent to Allied operations in out-of-area operations. The first was the introduction of the so called “non-Article 5” operations (mostly in the form of Peace Support Operations (PSO) and Peace Keeping Operations (PKO)). These are operations pertaining to the direct interests of the Alliance, which, nevertheless, do not take the form of an armed attack against any of its members. Moreover, the effect of such events that fall under this category can have a diverse magnitude of concern on different Allies, and thus the interest of supporting such operations in the context of the Alliance can also vary. In other words some Allies may pursue vigorously such operations and others may not. However, the latter do not impede nor fall short of Allied obligations and thus serve the Alliance. The second concept was the

⁵⁴ Ian Q. R. Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination*, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 128.

⁵⁵ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security*, (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1997), 189.

⁵⁶ Marc Bentinck, *NATO’s out-of-area problem*, Adelphi papers, no. 211 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986), 9.

establishment of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), where combined denotes cooperation among Allies and partners, and joint refers to the fact that it employs forces for all types of operations. This model incorporates Allied and cooperative nations either under the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, aspiring Allies, or Russia and/or Ukraine.

The conceptual approach of the Allies to out-of-area operations adopting the concepts of non-Article 5 operations and CJTF is one side of the coin. On the other side, there are a number of issues raised, which are pertinent to the material support of such operations, such as, infrastructure demands, assets, and furthermore political issues as to the usefulness of conducting such operations, public opinion support, and Allied cohesiveness. NATO is the only military Alliance at present with the ability to undertake operations outside of its territorial range, despite any bitter rhetoric surfacing.⁵⁷ Moreover, the non-Article 5 operations are not strictly attached to the Euro-Atlantic Area covered explicitly by the Washington Treaty.

The first Gulf War of 1991 was the first tangible operation in which practical out-of-area issues were raised. However, NATO forces while not being on the ground under the Allied banner used extensively the Allied infrastructure.⁵⁸

In addition, Allied interdependence was tested successfully (more or less) and provided the necessary prerequisites for conducting multinational coalition operations.

The assertion that demands for out-of-area operations will most likely develop outside the Euro-Atlantic Area seems plausible and logical, empirical evidence advocates that “[t]he majority of future crises will likely fall into what was

⁵⁷ Graeme Herd, "Out of area, out of business?," *The World Today*, 60 Aug/Sep (2004): 4-6. In short Herd argues that it's better to have a strong ruler in both Afghanistan and Iraq than to have a failed state. Moreover he argues that NATO fell short of expectations with the stabilization forces deployed in Afghanistan and also foreordains NATO's failure in Afghanistan Moreover he asserts that NATO's ISAF leadership, support and participation is a like an Article 5 operation.

⁵⁸ Ian Q. R. Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination*, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 158-159.

formerly considered "out of area" [or what the term really denotes]. While Alliance members were required to consult with each other when their security was threatened beyond NATO'S boundaries, the alliance, or a group of alliance members, was not prohibited from acting together in other areas. But what was once an ad hoc and almost tangential alliance activity will now move to center stage. NATO members, therefore, must be able to assemble a coalition quickly, fashion policy and strategy, create a command staff, deploy forces, and build a support infrastructure."⁵⁹ While the aforementioned extract sounds coherent, it is imperative that it is supplemented by the following remarks:

To "assemble a coalition quickly" does not mean that a coalition should be brought together without the consultation process taking place with all the Allies. This requires that Article 4 must be the basis for the formation of coalitions, through consensus. Moreover consultation is the only plausible tool for reaching an agreement among democracies. Paraphrasing Winston Churchill, one can argue that, consultation is the worst form of discussion we have among democracies, except for all those others that have been tried.

To "fashion policy and strategy, create a command staff" means in other words to apply and comply the strategic concept of 1999. While "deploy forces" resonates in the strategic concept of 1999, it has found a more eloquent expression in the Prague Capabilities Commitment process. To "build a support infrastructure" would be more appropriate than to adapt the existing infrastructure to the new requirement and supplement it where weaknesses arise.

Finally, it can be argued that as almost every other aspect of NATO's fundamentals, the geographic area in which the Alliance can undertake new roles has been transformed as this has been articulated in the 1999 Strategic Concept

⁵⁹ Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and Stephen F. Larrabee, "Building a new NATO," *Foreign Affairs*, 72 Sep/Oct (1993): 39.

of the Alliance.⁶⁰ What needs to be done now is that “NATO should focus on improving forces that already exist rather than on creating new forces.”⁶¹

C. CONCLUSION

NATO is an Alliance of distinct powers, which have their own priorities and interests, emanating from the internal political dynamics of each member state. However, the collective security commitment embodied in Article 5 is an explicit guarantor of stability inside the Alliance, ensuring Allied cohesiveness. The Treaty is a simple document⁶² consisting of only fourteen Articles, which describe the rights and obligations of the member states in general terms. It does not specify any threat, and as it has been characterized by Secretary Acheson, it is a “part of an ancient historical evolution driven by the principals of democracy, individual liberty, and rule of law.”⁶³

“The kind of obligation entailed by the Washington Treaty is [that] the Parties agree to assist each other as best they can in given circumstances, while reserving the right to consult their own interests in determining the form that such assistance should take. This becomes an especially important question when considering the extension of the American “nuclear umbrella” to Europe. Doing so required America's European partners to believe that the U.S. would expose its own population to a nuclear attack in order to defend them.”⁶⁴

⁶⁰ North Atlantic Council, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept* [Internet] (NAC, 7/10/2000 1991, accessed 10/6 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b911108a.htm>.

⁶¹ Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and Stephen F. Larrabee, “Building a new NATO,” *Foreign Affairs*, 72 Sep/Oct (1993): 40.

⁶² It was so characterized by President Truman, and 54 years later Lord Robertson notes metaphorically that the “[t]reaty [had to] be written so that it could be understood by a milkman from Omaha;” see George Robertson, “The Omaha Milkman Today: NATO's Transformation - An Agenda for a New Century,” *RUSI Journal*; *Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies*, 149 Feb (2004).

⁶³ Ian Q. R. Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination*, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 21.

⁶⁴ Interview of the author with Thesis Co-Advisor, Professor D. J. Moran, at the Naval Postgraduate Scholl, Monterey, CA. 9/16/2004.

Moreover, while the notion of collective defense of the Euro-Atlantic area remains the central theme for NATO, the Alliance had to readjust the means and the policies to the mandates of the Strategic Concept of 1999. In other words, a new dual track policy has to be applied and supported. By and large, NATO was “not typical of the *ad hoc* alliances used so extensively in the modern Europe, to meet a particular crisis nor to wage any war; nor it is typical of the treaties designed to achieve a delicate balancing of power.”⁶⁵ Furthermore, as a peace time Alliance experiment for the U.S., NATO represented a major departure from the previous approaches towards Europe as it demonstrated that “[t]he security of Western Europe and North America were inseparably linked.”⁶⁶

“Despite academic predictions that its years are numbered, NATO persists and adapts.”⁶⁷ NATO has exhibited its institutional adaptability by readjusting its organization to fulfil the strategic demands of contemporary times. The Alliance has deployed forces in support of operations outside the context of Article 5, the non-Article 5 operations, but within the frame of the fundamental principles of the North Atlantic Treaty. Thus, NATO keeps the pledge fulfilled when and where issues pertinent to the collective defense of the Allies occur.

⁶⁵ Congressional Record (5 July 1949); 8984 cited in Ian Q. R. Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination*, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 27.

⁶⁶ Ian Q. R. Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination*, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 49.

⁶⁷ Christian Tuschhoff, "Why NATO is Still Relevant," *International Politics*, 40 Mar (2003): 102.

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III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ALLIANCE AS AN INSTITUTION UNDER THE PERSPECTIVE OF ARTICLES 4, 5 AND 6 OF THE WASHINGTON TREATY 1949

A. INTRODUCTION

The nature of Allies is that they expect to be consulted. We cannot share responsibility without sharing sensitive information and without discussing policy decisions that affect our Allies before the decisions are made. We also expect that once our Allies understand and agree with a line of policy and action, they will raise the money, send the forces, or otherwise join in the action.

There is no magic answer to the ticklish relationship that results from these mutual expectations among the Atlantic Allies. But the best antidote to uncoordinated stupidity among friends is long, candid, and often tedious talk about real problems.⁶⁸

This chapter will examine four historical cases pertinent to Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty, and their impact on Allied policy and strategy. It will also illustrate how Articles 4 and 6 have revolved around Article 5, despite the different views and interpretations stemming from the divergent interests of the Allies, as well as, the spectacular, sometimes almost catastrophic results that may follow when consultation breaks down.⁶⁹ The consultation process is double-edged. On one hand, Allies bring up issues pertinent to their security on a collective or individual basis, on the other hand, they reserve the right to consult

⁶⁸ Harlan Cleveland, *NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain*, 1st ed. (New York,: Harper & Row, 1970), 13. Harlan Cleveland was the "U.S. Permanent Representative on the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with the rank and status of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary; until Jul 1, 1967, also Chief of the U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations at Paris." North Atlantic Treaty Organization [Internet] (U.S. Department of State 10/23/2000 1956, accessed 11/27 2004); available from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/po/com/12312.htm>. He served in NATO until 1969.

⁶⁹ While the consultation process among the "potential Allies" during the negotiations of the Washington Treaty was inherent in the process and expressed ad verbum, in Article 4, NATO recognized that nonmilitary cooperation among the Allies had great margins for further amelioration; thus the May 1956 NAC adopted a resolution for a committee (of three Foreign Ministers – a.k.a. the "three Wise Men" committee) to suggest ways to improve nonmilitary cooperation among the Allies. For further details see North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué - Committee of Three Foreign Ministers appointed to advise the Council on ways and means to extend cooperation in non-military fields and to strengthen unity in the Atlantic community. [Internet] (NATO, 10/23/2000 1956, accessed 10/10 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c560505a.htm>.

as to what form of assistance they would provide, if needed. Or to a further extent, as Harlan Cleveland eloquently puts it:

“Most of the arguments about allied consultation result from decisions by individual Allies to misplace a topic along this spectrum. ‘Are you telling us or consulting us?’ is the question most frequently asked when a topic is presented for discussion in the North Atlantic Council. The real answer often requires the questioner to ask himself another question in turn: ‘Do I want to take the responsibility of being consulted for real and contracting some obligation to act on (or to be restricted by) my own advice?’”⁷⁰

In the early NATO years, the Allies realized that in order for the Alliance to have an effect, it should produce a common policy, stemming from a common strategy. Despite the fact that this premise was no novelty⁷¹ in NATO’s case, most of the policies for “in-area” issues were consistent. Although strong debate might initially have overshadowed the political outcome, the Allies eventually found, and still do, common grounds in their understanding, accommodating their individual interests.

Out-of-area issues have proven more problematic. The well-defined area of the Alliance in Article 6 leaves no margin for misjudgment on collective defense issues, should they arise in that area. On the other hand, there are occasions where the course of action chosen by some Allies to serve their interests in out-of-area issues, raise objections within the Atlantic community. Such objections are most acute when the actions are not shared within the Alliance and involve unilateral actions undertaken by a single ally, or a colluded

⁷⁰ Harlan Cleveland, *NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain*, 1st ed. (New York,: Harper & Row, 1970), 19.

⁷¹ Most alliances, even those dominated by a single, all-powerful partner (like the Warsaw pact “run by Moscow with an iron fist”) have a clause pertinent to consultation (Warsaw pact Article 3) Yale Law School Avalon-Project, *The Warsaw Security Pact: May 14, 1955* [Internet] (Yale Law School, 10/6/2004 1998, accessed 9/28 2004); available from <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/intdip/soviet/warsaw.htm>. Yale Law School Avalon-Project, *The Warsaw Security Pact: May 14, 1955* [Internet] (Yale Law School, 10/6/2004 1998, accessed 9/28 2004); available from <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/intdip/soviet/warsaw.htm>. For further details on how NATO was used as a model for the Warsaw pact see Gustav Schmidt, ed., *A History of NATO - The First Fifty Years*, 3 vols., vol. 2 (New York: Palgrave, 2001).

fait accompli stemming from the strict notion of serving national interests. Despite the fact that there are no practical geographical limits to the political consultation process for the members of the Alliance, Allies either small or big have failed occasionally to function to the benefit of common interest. Thus the main question of this chapter is how the procedures and norms set forth in the Washington Treaty affected the evolution of the Alliance. This question will be examined in two parts: the evolution of Allied cooperation inside the Alliance, and the effects of a failure to adhere to the consultation norm or the failure of the norm itself on the Alliance.

To scrutinize these two parts of the question, this chapter will examine how the political consultation norm was established, and how it has evolved. Furthermore, it will also examine two distinct cases, the well-known and thoroughly examined, Suez crisis of 1956, which can be characterized as the Anglo-French collusion of 1956, and the unilateral actions of the U.S. administration during the October (Yom Kippur) War of 1973. Last but not least, it will examine briefly, the reaction of the Alliance to the unexpected end of the Cold War, and the dilemmas resulting from this new strategic environment.

B. THE DEVELOPMENT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE POLITICO-MILITARY CONSULTATION DURING THE COLD WAR

1. General

Consultation inside the Alliance is a free process which was developed during a series of situations that arose and did not necessarily involve any considerations stemming from issues of defense. The NAC, in which all member states participate through their permanent representatives (permreps, bearing ambassadorial credentials), convenes at least once a week. The NAC also convenes as needed at higher levels, such as Foreign Ministers, or Defense

Ministers, or even Heads of State and Government. Nonetheless, “its decisions have the same status and validity at what ever level it meets.”⁷²

The NAC is the only apparatus inside the Alliance deriving its authority directly from the Treaty (Article 9). “Meetings of the NAC have been utilized on several occasions for the discussion of political issues related to security.⁷³ In other words, the NAC is the ultimate collective decision-making apparatus inside the Alliance and the forum where member nations are free to express their views on issues pertaining to their interest.

However, examining the history of political consultation inside the Alliance, the “first committee appointed by NATO in 1951 to consider how the non-military activities of the Organization could be increased had, after protracted deliberations, come out of the same door it had entered.”⁷⁴ During the early years, NAC meetings or bilateral deliberations were able to accommodate the requirements of policy formulating. After all, during its very early period, the Alliance had no military structure to support Allied strategy. More or less, the Alliance was using the normal channels of diplomacy which were considered adequate for dealing with “routine political issues.”⁷⁵

Even before the establishment of NATO’s military structure stemming from the fear caused by the events in Korea, the NAC in its first session sought to examine ways to setup the “machinery” of political consultation mostly motivated by Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty.⁷⁶ Thus the NAC appointed a committee

⁷² North Atlantic Treaty Organization - Office of Information and Press, *NATO Handbook*, (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001).

⁷³ Norman J. Padelford, "Political Cooperation in the North Atlantic Community," *International Organization*, 9 3 (1955): 353-365.

⁷⁴ Gardner Patterson, Edgar Stephenson Furniss, and Princeton University., *NATO, A Critical Appraisal*, (Princeton, N.J.: 1957), 69.

⁷⁵ Norman J. Padelford, "Political Cooperation in the North Atlantic Community," *International Organization*, 9 3 (1955): 355.

⁷⁶ Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as mentioned above, in short stipulates a call for the Allies to develop further peaceful and friendly relations in the direction of achieving political and economic goals. For further details see North Atlantic Treaty Organization - Office of Information and Press, *NATO Handbook*, (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), 527.

under the Canadian Foreign Minister L. Pearson. "The Pearson Committee first reviewed the work...which was already being done by member governments in other international bodies. It soon found that quite a lot had been, and was being done."⁷⁷ In this connection, it is worth mentioning the proposal set forth by "Senator Guy M. Gillette of Iowa in 1951 [for] an annual meeting of legislators from the several NATO countries more or less along the lines of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe...[along with] [r]epresentatives of Norway [who had] pressed for such a gathering."⁷⁸ This initiative of the Norwegian Parliamentarians and the U.S. Senator is recorded as the precursor of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

2. The Committee of the Three

The next major effort to formulate the norms of NATO's political consultation was the committee of the "Three Wise Men" which filed its report for the consideration of the NAC in 1956. The works of this committee are considered a milestone for the Alliance since the three Foreign Ministers⁷⁹ had to take into account "severe strains" in the intra-Allied relations, obviously emanating from the very recent the Suez crisis. The committee produced a very elaborate final text which dealt with not only the issues of political consultation, but also with out-of-area problems and methods to coordinate policies when such issues arise. It also reaffirmed and in a way still reminds the Allies that their cooperation stems from a far-reaching commitment as expressed in Article 5. The committee also underlined the issues of solidarity, and thus allied cohesion, those of economic and political cooperation, which in turn provide additional incentives for the Allies to develop a closer collective relationship. Moreover, the

⁷⁷ Lord Ismay, *The First Five Years 1952-1957* [Internet] (2001, accessed 10/11 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/chapters/14.htm>.

⁷⁸ Ibid.; Norman J. Padelford, "Political Cooperation in the North Atlantic Community," *International Organization*, 9 3 (1955): 361.

⁷⁹ Halvard Lange of Norway, Gaetano Martino of Italy and Lester Pearson of Canada.

committee referred to the out-of-area issues⁸⁰, since not only there are Allies with worldwide commitments and interests, but also events occurring outside the North Atlantic area exert great influence and have substantial repercussions on the collective interests of the Alliance. In addition “the wise men called for “NATO consultation whenever economic issues of special interest to the Alliance are involved, particularly those which have political or defense implications or affect the economic health of the Atlantic Community as a whole.”⁸¹ The committee also articulated the very close relationship that exists between foreign policy and defense from an Allied perspective: “There cannot be unity in defence and disunity in foreign policy.”⁸²

The crux of the committee’s findings can be summarized in its recommendations as follows:

members should inform the Council of any development which significantly affects the Alliance. They should do this, not merely as formality but as a preliminary to effective political consultation

both individual member governments and the Secretary General should have the right to raise for discussion in the Council any subject which is of common NATO interest and not of a purely domestic character;

⁸⁰ On the out-of-area issues there are opinions that argue that “[i]n an observation of considerable foresight, the report also identified widening geographic concerns: “NATO should not forget that the influence and interests of its members are not confined to the area covered by the Treaty, and that common interests of the Atlantic Community can be seriously affected by developments outside the Treaty area.” Thomas J. Kennedy, *NATO Politico-Military Consultation: Shaping Alliance Decisions*, National security affairs monograph series ; 84-3 (Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press; Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O. [distributor], 1984), 10. While there is no doubt that the three Wise Men were particularly foresighted, on the other hand one can argue that their findings were greatly influenced by hindsight, since the reverberations of the Suez crisis earlier that year were still resonating. The crisis provided them a tangible argument what can happen when there is lack of political consultation. Moreover, there is an implicit remark on the Suez crisis on par. 4 of the report. For further details see North Atlantic Council, *Text of the Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO*. [Internet] (NATO, 6/4/2000 1956, accessed 10/10 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b561213a.htm>.

⁸¹ Frederic L. Kirgis, "NATO Consultations as a Component of National Decisionmaking," *The American Journal of International Law*, 73 3 (1979): 376.

⁸² North Atlantic Council, *Text of the Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO*. [Internet] (NATO, 6/4/2000 1956, accessed 10/10 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b561213a.htm>.

a member government should not, without adequate advance consultation, adopt firm policies or make major political pronouncements on matters which significantly affect the Alliance or any of its members, unless circumstances make such prior consultation obviously and demonstrably impossible;

in developing their national policies, members should take into consideration the interest and views of other governments, particularly those most directly concerned, as expressed in NATO consultation, even where no community of views or consensus has been reached in the Council;

where a consensus has been reached, it should be reflected in the formation of national policies. When for national reasons the consensus is not followed, the government concerned should offer an explanation to the Council. It is even more important that where an agreed and formal recommendation has emerged from the Council's discussions, governments should give it full weight in any national actions or policies related to the subject of that recommendation.⁸³

The consultation process inside the Alliance continued to develop and was enhanced by the adoption of several levels in the pertinent "machinery." The appointment of Secretary General during the Lisbon Council in 1952 and "the creation of the Division of Political Affairs"⁸⁴ provided the Alliance with additional elements where member nations cooperate through the consultation process. The appointment of the Secretary General of the Council is of particular significance, since, while up to that point the Council was not headless⁸⁵ the presiding Minister had a dual role to serve. The office of Secretary General was utilized to supersede this dualism being observed when the presiding delegate

⁸³ North Atlantic Council, *Text of the Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO*. [Internet] (NATO, 6/4/2000 1956, accessed 10/10 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b561213a.htm>.

⁸⁴ Political Affairs Division North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Historical-Officer, Monograph on "*The evolution of NATO political consultation 1949 - 1962*" [Internet] (NATO, 2004, accessed 2/28 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/archives/docu/d630503.htm>.

⁸⁵ The U.S. representative presided the NAC acting as both the presiding officer and national delegate.

had also to serve his simultaneous duties as a national representative.⁸⁶ In other words, the institutionalization of the officer presiding the North Atlantic Council added one more level, not only to the deliberation process within the Alliance, but also to the external image of the Alliance, since NATO had acquired a more substantive form. The development of several standing or *ad-hoc* working groups contributed to the consolidation of common consultation procedures, in a productive top-down approach which allows the member nations to express their views in a variety of issues and finally reach an agreement forwarded to higher levels.

In later years, the rhetoric about consultation as a means to promote allied cohesion remained vigorous.

Increased consultation in NATO was praised by Dulles as providing the means to realize the more positive goals of the Atlantic Community. Consultation would do more than prevent a repeat of Suez; *it will help to demonstrate* that the nations of this community are not solely concerned with matters of military defense to create a defense against Soviet aggression. We are also developing a political climate good for all people everywhere who want to see peace and justice and human welfare.

The difference between pre- and post-Suez conceptions of an “Atlantic Community rests in the emphasis placed on consultation in the post-Suez period.”⁸⁷

3. The Harmel Report

The next major milestone for the Alliance consultation process was the Harmel report of 1967. The report, named the “Future Tasks of the Alliance,”⁸⁸

⁸⁶ Political Affairs Division North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Historical-Officer., Monograph on “*The evolution of NATO political consultation 1949 - 1962*” [Internet] (NATO, 2004, accessed 2/28 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/archives/docu/d630503.htm>.

⁸⁷ Ian Q. R. Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination*, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 58.

⁸⁸ The Harmel Committee North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *The Future Tasks of the Alliance* (“The Harmel Report”) [Internet] (NATO, 2004, accessed 10/12 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b671213a.htm>.

reaffirmed the necessity and value of consultation for the Alliance, but also for the individual member states, which “[a]s sovereign states...are not obliged to subordinate their policies to collective decision. The Alliance affords an effective forum and clearing house for the exchange of information and views; thus, each of the Allies can decide its policy in the light of close knowledge of the problems and objectives of the others. To this end, the practice of frank and timely consultations needs to be deepened and improved. Each ally should play its full part in promoting an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, bearing in mind that the pursuit of détente must not be allowed to split the Alliance. The chances of success will clearly be greatest if the Allies remain on parallel courses, especially in matters of close concern to them all.”⁸⁹ Despite the fact that the main goal of the Harmel report was not directly connected with the “habit of consultation,” it stressed the importance of political cooperation among the Allies and the importance of strong Allied political institutions.⁹⁰

4. The Ottawa Declaration

In 1973, the Middle East would again become the epicentre of the consultation process, or more precisely the lack thereof, inside the Alliance. Once more, historic events would occur in a territory outside the Alliance’s area, with the political conditions by and large uncontrollable by the majority of the Allies. Such politico-military events would show that common practice was not kept this time from the other side of the Atlantic. Moreover, the forthcoming crisis can be traced in the U.S. involvement in Indochina and its repercussions for the European Allies.

⁸⁹ The Harmel Committee North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *The Future Tasks of the Alliance* (“The Harmel Report”) [Internet] (NATO, 2004, accessed 10/12 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b671213a.htm>.

⁹⁰ Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic community: The Transatlantic Bargain reconsidered*, (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 49. As Sloan points out the Alliance after a few weeks of the approval of the Harmel report established a “Senior Political Committee.”

Since 1969, when Nixon and Kissinger had adopted the Nixon Doctrine (“America’s new criteria for involvement abroad”⁹¹), the European Allies were suspicious about the real incentives behind it. This suspicion arose from the fact that U.S. policy was focused mainly in Indochina which absorbed most of the resources. “Between 1963 and 1970, one hundred thousand troops had been withdrawn from Europe.”⁹² During that period (the late 60s early 70s), the U.S. was well involved in the “Vietnam debacle” and was looking for ways to extricate itself. After the proclamation of the Nixon Doctrine, the gradual withdrawal from Southeast Asia, and the events on the economic sphere,⁹³ in 1973 Kissinger (Nixon’s National Security Advisor) put forward his proposal “for a new ‘Atlantic Charter,’ a rededication of the Atlantic Alliance, followed in a major address on April 23, 1973...Laced with arrogance, the speech was drawn up without significant consultation either at home or abroad. *Not even Secretary of State William Rodgers had advance notice of Kissinger’s terms.*”⁹⁴

Such lack of consultation characterized Kissinger’s tenure in the U.S. administration. Moreover, it constitutes a case study on the influence of domestic politics on international events and the potential for worldwide ramifications. Furthermore, it shows that domestic politics, namely the Watergate scandal, that had kept the U.S. president preoccupied, “left Kissinger with more power than he had enjoyed in the first administration.”⁹⁵ The Allied unity was severely breached with the events of the Yom Kippur war of 1973. “...American anger was [beyond

⁹¹ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 707-708.

⁹² Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, *Allies in Crisis: Meeting Global Challenges to Western Security*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 137.

⁹³ In 1971 the U.S. abandoned the Bretton-Woods agreements (the peg of U.S. dollar to gold), which shaped the post World War II international economy; moreover, U.S. imposed protectionist tariffs on all imports. The result was a dispute between the U.S. on one hand and Western European countries and Japan on the other, since the latter were the main economic partners of the U.S.

⁹⁴ Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The long entanglement: NATO’s first fifty years*, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), 155. (emphasis mine).

⁹⁵ Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance*, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2004), 69.

any doubt caused by] Europe's distancing...from its major ally."⁹⁶ Despite the underlying "political and economic undertones," Europe's behaviour may well have been considered a parallel of the U.S.'s behaviour towards Britain and France. As "American coercion of its Allies, [during the Suez crisis], resulted from a mutual sense of betrayal of the community, leading to the violation of norms and the temporary breakdown of the collective identity,"⁹⁷ the European Allies functioned in an analogous manner. The Europeans considered that the prime ally did not abide with established norms, and distanced itself from the "habit of consultation." After all, issuing a DEFCON III alert⁹⁸ with the Allies being informed about it from mass media⁹⁹ would possibly endanger a nuclear confrontation.

The following year, 1974, twenty five years after the conclusion of the Washington Treaty of 1949, in the aftermath of the October War in the Middle East, and the unilateralism exhibited by the U.S. the NAC issued the Declaration on the "Atlantic relations." Its paragraph 11 reads as follows:

The Allies are convinced that the fulfilment of their common aims requires the maintenance of close consultation, cooperation and mutual trust, thus fostering the conditions necessary for defence and favorable for detente, which are complementary. In the spirit of the friendship, equality and solidarity which characterize their relationships, they are firmly resolved to keep each other fully informed and to strengthen the practice of frank and timely consultations by all means which may be appropriate on matters relating to their common interests as members of the Alliance, bearing in mind that these interests can be affected by events in

⁹⁶ Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance*, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2004), 69.

⁹⁷ Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence On U.S. Foreign Policy*, Princeton studies in international history and politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), 83-84.

⁹⁸ Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, (Boston: Little Brown, 1982), 588. Even Kissinger himself in a self-criticizing purgatory note writes "In retrospect I think this procedure [keep the Allies in the dark, being afraid of leaks] was wrong. We could have informed our Allies an hour or two before delivering our reply to Moscow; we should have risked the leaks." *Ibid.*, 590.

⁹⁹ Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, *Allies in Crisis: Meeting Global Challenges to Western Security*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 141.

other areas of the world. They wish also to ensure that their essential security relationship is supported by harmonious political and economic relations. In particular they will work to remove sources of conflict between their economic policies and to encourage economic cooperation with one another.¹⁰⁰

Once more, one can observe a recurring pattern for NATO, by which the Allies pledge to “keep each other fully informed [of actions and policies that have Alliance-wide effects].” Moreover, the declaration recognizes the fact, which bears historical accuracy in its own right, that Allied interests “can be affected by events in other areas of the world.”¹⁰¹ Also the wording of the declaration implies that consultation was neither timely nor frank, since the Allies “are firmly resolved” and expressed their determined will to “strengthen” the practise of consultation.

In subsequent years, NATO’s consultation process was tested and retested through various developments in areas of strategy and policy, including the deployment of a new generation of ballistic missiles and the response to the Warsaw pact’s efforts for modernization. Moreover, the Alliance, based on the axioms of the Harmel report, pursued a “dual track” policy.¹⁰² One track was promoting the deployment of the aforementioned missiles, while the other called for arms control, since both sides were “long past the point of saturation.”¹⁰³

5. “Dual track” up to the 1980s

During the decade from the late 1970s until late 1980s, the consultation process among the Allies was a common practice. In addition, several issues

¹⁰⁰ North Atlantic Council, *Declaration on Atlantic Relations* [Internet] (NATO, 10/23/2000 1974, accessed 10/12 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c740618b.htm>, par., 11.

¹⁰¹ Similar is the comment of Frederic L. Kirgis. For further details see Frederic L. Kirgis, “NATO Consultations as a Component of National Decisionmaking,” *The American Journal of International Law*, 73, no. 3 (1979): , 377.

¹⁰² Ian Q. R. Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination*, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 117-118.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

were raised like, the “dual track” policy, the Soviet SS-20 missiles versus NATO’s Pershing II, the natural gas Euro-Soviet pipeline, and the Carter doctrine. While there were several controversial reactions to certain policies, none became “out of control” and thus no spectacular event of the magnitude of those of the preceding decades occurred. In contrast, with the Carter doctrine – “[the] proclamation of American interests in Southwest Asia...”¹⁰⁴ – a new era was formally introduced and was marked by official NATO collective concerns about out-of-area issues. The culmination of the “capable Allies” to operate out-of-area, came in a region that would challenge Allied policies in the following years, and that was the Persian Gulf during 1987-88.¹⁰⁵

In Europe, the main Cold War “battleground,” the 1980s were dominated by the unexpected changes that occurred in the Soviet Union with the rise in

¹⁰⁴ Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, *Allies in Crisis: Meeting Global Challenges to Western Security*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 148. The Carter doctrines came as a resultant of two components, first the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and second the British withdrawal from “East of Suez.” The Soviet invasion in Afghanistan was seen by the U.S. administration combined with the unfavorable developments in Iran as an effort for the Soviets to consolidate their presence in Southwest Asia and by extension border the Arabian Peninsula. Historically, and in a larger context both events (the British withdrawal and the Soviet efforts to approach the Persian Gulf) can be traced during the Second World War and its aftermath. The Atlantic Charter articulated clearly the provisions of the British withdrawal as its third policy reads: Third, they [the U.S. and British governments] respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them. For further details see: *Yale Law School Avalon-Project*, Atlantic Charter [Internet] (*Yale Law School*, 10/6/2004 1998, accessed 9/28 2004); available from <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/atlantic.htm>. Moreover, the Soviet Union immediately after the Second World War in an effort to gain more leverage against the Western powers tried to encroach Iran through pressures exerted to the Iranian government by the Iranian Communist party. For further details see: William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth-Century World: An International History*, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 255-257.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 177-183. The tanker war was “waged” during the Iran-Iraq war in the Persian Gulf. Due to the stalemate on the ground the two belligerents initiated attacks against each other’s merchant shipping. Iraq’s strategy was to bring the Western powers into the war by forcing Iran to actions (such as closing the Hormuz straits) that would entail the Western intervention. However, the Iranian mullahs were cautious enough not to provoke the West and even “refrained from public acknowledgement of its attacks on civilian shipping.” Moreover, Iranian attacks were mainly directed against shipping trading with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, as they were the financial supporters of its enemy. Kuwait asked the superpowers to protect its shipping and the U.S. offered its protection if the Kuwaiti shipping was flying the U.S. flag. By the end of 1987 after fruitful U.S. diplomatic efforts Iran was against a powerful multinational armada of almost 50 ships. For further details see: Efraim Karsh, *Essential Histories - The Iran-Iraq war 1980-1988*, (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 1989), 51-61.

power of Michael Gorbachev.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, in the early 1980s the U.S., through President Reagan, changed its policies from “peaceful coexistence” to what might be called “peaceful confrontation.” The U.S. initiated an ambitious ballistic missile defense scheme under the title “Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI),”¹⁰⁷ as well as, other advanced military initiatives. While the overall technology was not advanced enough to meet the stated operational requirements of SDI, it was certain that in the long run advances would come which the Soviets would be hard-pressed to match. At the same time, such developments increased the existing capability gap between the European Allies and the U.S.¹⁰⁸ In any case, as already mentioned, no “spectacular” events occurred in the Alliance, in terms regarding the consultation machinery. However, NATO was trying to decipher the repercussions of the rhetoric of the new Soviet leader. Moreover, a climate of euphoria spurred within the Alliance¹⁰⁹ since the two superpowers succeeded in agreeing and signing the “Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF)” Treaty which

¹⁰⁶ The death of Leonid Brezhnev on 10 November 1982 marked a period of change in the Soviet Union since it led to the rise of Michael Gorbachev on 11 March 1985. Before Gorbachev’s ascension to power, two other Soviet leaders (Y. Andropov and K. Chernenko) had died.

¹⁰⁷ SDI aimed to develop an integrated Anti Ballistic Missile system that would deny “Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)” in the early stages after their launch; also publicly known as “Star Wars”.

¹⁰⁸ Many argue that Europe is actually a “free-rider” on this issue, being protected by the nuclear guarantees provided by the U.S. and focusing on her economic development. Others argue that the European Allies were providing during the Cold War “75 percent of NATO’s readily available ground forces in Europe, 75 percent of the tanks, 65 percent of the air forces and 60 percent of the naval vessels. The percentages were obviously higher when French forces were added to the list.” Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance*, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2004), 98. While the debate of burden sharing and burden shifting is a separate study in its own right (for further details *inter alia* see: Wallace J. Thies, *Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-shifting in NATO*, (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2003),; and for a past analysis :Alain C. Enthoven, “U.S. Forces in Europe: How Many? Doing What?,” *Foreign Affairs*, 53, no. 3 (1975): 518-521.), one can argue that the fragmentation of the European defense industry is a substantial factor to be examined. Empirical evidence advocates such an assertion. For example, on the “Anti-Ship Missile (ASM)” field, European countries that are NATO members have to exhibit at least three different products (if one considers the Norwegian made “Penguin” missile and the almost ready to enter “Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP)” NSM, as one family). On the other hand the U.S. defense industry has only one such missile to exhibit. However, besides the European defense industry fragmentation, the fact remains that there is a “capabilities gap,” which challenges policies on both sides of the Atlantic.

¹⁰⁹ Actually for NATO the INF treaty was considered the palpable result of a well coordinated, sustained and comprehensive policy formulated in the late 1960s. For further analysis see: Ian Q. R. Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination*, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 138-140.

“eliminated all land based missiles with ranges between 500 and 5500 kilometres.”¹¹⁰ The INF Treaty was based on the strategy articulated in the Harmel report that “...called on NATO to pursue negotiations with the Soviets on the basis of military strength and political solidarity. The 1979 decision [leading to the deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles] had been the latest doctrinal manifestation of this formula, and the success of the INF negotiations now appeared to justify the heavy political price that the deployment decision had exacted in terms of public opposition throughout the early 1980s.”¹¹¹

C. THE 1956 SUEZ CRISIS

1. Introduction

The Suez crisis illustrates what the lack of consultation, especially in military alliances, can mean. Many scholars attribute the reasons for the crisis to an “amalgamate,” a fusion of personal misunderstandings and perceptions as well as of broader strategic considerations. Moreover, there are studies of the economic aspect of the crisis, or studies that conclude with explanations based on power politics.¹¹² However, there is one unbiased, objective and unshakable historic event, well recorded and documented that led to the Suez crisis, and that is the lack of consultation among the U.S., United Kingdom and France. Besides the fact that the crisis is shown not to have affected the “close relationship” between the Britain and the U.S. it has underlined its post Second World War status. Moreover, the Suez crisis is not an isolated event. It came as a corollary of other affairs and shaped the Middle and Near East for the years following.

¹¹⁰ Ian Q. R. Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination*, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 138.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² For a further analysis of the debate about the reasons that led to the Suez crisis see: Tore T. Petersen, *The Middle East between the great powers: Anglo-American conflict and cooperation, 1952-7*, (Houndmills England; New York: Macmillan Press; St. Martin's Press, 2000), 66-75.

2. Brief Historical Background

The end of the Second World War brought widespread changes in the International System. One of the most prominent was the end of colonialism and the emergence of what became known as the Third World. A leading figure in these developments was Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, “who had acquired dictatorial power in Egypt and “envisioned a vast Pan-Arab empire from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf under his own leadership.”¹¹³

One can argue that the events of 1951 in Iran¹¹⁴ provided the precursor to the Suez crisis and the forceful withdrawal of the British from that region. On July 26, 1956, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company.¹¹⁵ That move initiated a series of events that would lead to Anglo-French collusion with the Israelis¹¹⁶ for a coordinated attack against Egypt. This attack aimed at restoring the formers’ control over the Suez Canal by military force, and providing Israel with Sinai as a security buffer zone. The French were “jointly [with the British] studying the

¹¹³ William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth-Century World: An International History*, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 297.

¹¹⁴ In 1951 Iran nationalized “Britain’s largest overseas investment”, Iran’s oil company, “[since] Iran had to pay more for its own oil than the British did. In fact, it would have been cheaper for Iran to import oil from the Soviet Union than use its own domestically produced oil. [...] Britain responded to Iran’s nationalization by shutting down the Abadan refinery [the largest oil refinery in the world], and threatened to sue anybody who bought Iranian oil, alleging that they were trafficking in stolen goods. The net result was effectively to blockade Iranian oil from the world market. Muhammed Mossadeqh, the Iranian Prime Minister, retaliated by breaking diplomatic relations with Britain in October 1952, but for all practical purposes the British blockade had bankrupted Iran. Tore T. Petersen, *The Middle East between the great powers: Anglo-American conflict and cooperation, 1952-7*, (Houndmills England; New York: Macmillan Press; St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 19.

¹¹⁵ Nasser’s main argument for the nationalization of the Suez Canal was the “abrupt” withdrawal of financing of the U.S. from the Aswan Dam due to Nasser’s “double game” with the Soviets and the Western powers. In other words, Nasser was accepting increased military aid from the Soviets while at the same time he was also getting economic aid from the West. When the West interrupted the economic aid Nasser “retaliated” by nationalizing the canal to compensate the losses with the canal’s revenues from tolls. For further details see: William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth-Century World: An International History*, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 297-300.

¹¹⁶ “On 24 October, [1956] Britain, France, and Israel signed a secret accord at Sevres, detailing their plans for joint military action against Nasser.⁹⁰ After an initial Israeli attack on Egyptian forces through the Sinai, following the predicted rejection of a cease-fire and withdrawal ultimatum,. Anglo-French military action would be initiated on the pretext separating Israeli and Egyptian belligerents.” Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, *Allies in Crisis: Meeting Global Challenges to Western Security*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 80.

military problem involved in the reoccupation of the Canal Zone.”¹¹⁷ Moreover, they held Nasser responsible for providing assistance to the Algerian insurgency, and so in their opinion, “If Egypt's action remained without a response, it would be useless to pursue the struggle in Algeria.”¹¹⁸

However, U.S. views were totally contradictory to the use of armed force. While Nasser's move was viewed by the U.S. administration with the same criticism as the British and the French, the prevalent opinion in Washington was that as long as Egypt was not attacking “our people” and was not impeding free navigation through the canal, there was no justification for the use of force. Moreover, there is some evidence that despite the fact that “president [Eisenhower] remained staunchly opposed to military force..., [the Secretary of State Dulles], favored stronger action against [Egypt] if Nasser rejected reasonable proposals....”¹¹⁹ The French, in their part, had concluded “that it was ‘better to act bilaterally [with the British] than do nothing trilaterally’....”¹²⁰ In October 1956, the collusion was in full-scale and military operations were initiated by the British and the French without informing the primary ally. “The result was the near destruction of the Alliance as the United States sided with the Soviets to oppose the Suez operation. It was a painful moment for all the Allies because the abortive invasion of Egypt coincided with Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt against the Warsaw Pact. Instead of condemning the Soviets' brutal actions in Hungary, NATO found itself on the defensive as the Communist world condemned the Anglo-French aggression against Egypt in the United

¹¹⁷ United States. Dept. of State. Historical Office., *Foreign Relations of the United States: Suez Crisis July 26 - December 31, 1956*, (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1990), 8. Message from U.S. Embassy in France to the State Department, July 27, 1956.

¹¹⁸ French Foreign Minister Pineau cited in Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence On U.S. Foreign Policy*, Princeton studies in international history and politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), 85.

¹¹⁹ Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence On U.S. Foreign Policy*, Princeton studies in international history and politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), 88.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 89.

Nations...Both Britain and France succumbed to this combined pressure and retreated from the canal.”¹²¹

3. Analysis

In the Suez case there is a clear divergence of perceptions about the interests of the Allies and how they are perceived by each individual actor. The U.S. on one hand had been committed to apply containment against Communist spread in areas where the conditions of popular unrest, and economic dissatisfaction prevailed. Higher strategic goals dictated that the U.S. would have to consider other options excluding military intervention or at least keeping it as a very remote potential, to solve the Suez crisis.

On the other hand the British sought to sustain pre Second World War colonial practices and Suez can be considered as such. Mercantile policies in a transformed world-wide political landscape where the Atlantic Charter’s declaration implicitly accepted the emancipation of colonial dominions were synonymous with political upheaval and regeneration of nationalist sentiments.

The French were also experiencing instability in Algeria, after having already suffered from what they regarded as abandonment by the “Anglo-Saxons” during their earlier campaign in Indochina. Their incentive to deal with Nasser, as mentioned above, stemmed from their perception that the latter was “supporting and sustaining the Algerian rebellion.”¹²² However, Egypt did not provide significant material aid to the [Algerian “*Front de Liberation Nationale*”] FLN; but then, neither did anyone else. It did provide some, however, and it certainly provided political support, including a base from which FLN external operatives could appeal to the larger world.

¹²¹ Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance*, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2004), 13.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 66.

The argument that the British were misled by Dulles sounds plausible but loses its effectiveness since the U.S. President had conveyed a clear message and had made his crystallized position on the issue well known to Eden. On his telegram to the British Prime Minister, dated September 8, 1956, he writes "... The use of military force against Egypt...might cause a serious misunderstanding between our two countries because I must say frankly that there is as yet no public opinion in this country which is prepared to accept [military action]... [R]esort to military action when the *world* (emphasis mine) believes that there are other means available for resolving the dispute would set in motion forces that could lead, in the years to come, to the most distressing results..."¹²³

Furthermore, one more dimension must be considered and it concerns U.S. attitude during the crisis. One can argue that this dimension is "enclosed" in Eisenhower's wording when he invoked U.S. public opinion, which was inherently against any colonial movement. Franklin D. Roosevelt's legacy was based on the premise that the post-Second World War European restructuring would be achieved "through disarmament and decolonization."¹²⁴ Moreover, "[e]conomic chaos, political frustration, and uncertainty were believed to be the sine qua non of Communist advance...With regard to empires The United States was sensitive on two interrelated issues: (1) avoidance of the creation of hostile, perhaps leftist oriented...developing nations; and (2) avoidance of close identification with the reactionary colonial policies of its European Allies especially those practices that corresponded with the purposes and goals widely attributed to the Soviets."¹²⁵

¹²³ United States. Dept. of State. Historical Office., *Foreign Relations of the United States: Suez Crisis July 26 - December 31, 1956*, (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1990), 435-438. Message from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden, September 8, 1956.

¹²⁴ John Lamberton Harper, *American Visions Of Europe : Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson*, (Cambridge ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 89.

¹²⁵ Lawrence S. Kaplan and Robert W. Clawson, *NATO after thirty years*, (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1981), 155.

As to the political consultation issue inside the Alliance, there is evidence that the British wished NATO to be “consulted” on a broader basis.¹²⁶ However, the U.S. opposed such strategy because it considered that there was danger in derailing other initiatives already underway, particularly “if it were to appear that NATO [was] directing Suez policy.”¹²⁷ Thus, there is clear evidence that from a political standpoint Britain, France, and the United States failed from the start to follow a coherent common course of action. This failure can be mainly attributed to the diverse incentives of the actors. The U.S. side was driven by anti-colonial sentiment manifested in opposing action against Nasser before exhausting all other political measures, and in particular those promoted by the U.S. Moreover, the U.S. failed to convey once more its messages when Dulles “pointedly did not attend, [and] all the other foreign ministers were present”¹²⁸ at the NAC meeting of September 5, 1956. On the other hand, in a message from the Secretary himself to the U.S. Embassy in Paris, Dulles expresses his frustration about the fact that “...we [the U.S.] do not know where they [the British and the French] stand *nor are we consulted* (emphasis mine).”¹²⁹ The British side was adamant to reassert its influence on the Middle East and considered military action as an

¹²⁶ United States. Dept. of State. Historical Office., *Foreign Relations of the United States: Suez Crisis July 26 - December 31, 1956*, (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1990), 309. Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the Secretary of State, August 28, 1956. Arguably, the wording of the message connotes to the notion that the British wanted rather to inform, than to consult “the other NATO representatives [on] ‘how [their] minds [were] working and get their views.’” One can argue that the British wanted to get views from the other Allies as to the best course of action in a rather prescribed line.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 339-340. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, August 30, 1956.

¹²⁸ Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, *Allies in Crisis: Meeting Global Challenges to Western Security*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 75.

¹²⁹ United States. Dept. of State. Historical Office., *Foreign Relations of the United States: Suez Crisis July 26 - December 31, 1956*, (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1990), 634. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in France, October 4, 1956.

imperative from the beginning.¹³⁰ The French inclinations were “to destroy the Egyptian leader because of this support for the Algerian rebels.”¹³¹

In any case, the fact remains that the Anglo-French coalition was forced to withdraw from Egypt. The Atlantic Alliance reached a critical point due to the cleavage among the three most powerful Allies, and as a result, Allied cohesion was heavily damaged, and the consultation norm seemed crippled, if not dead. However, the cohesive power stemming from the common enemy, as well as the premises on which democracies are based, allowed NATO to readjust and its members to embed in their rationale that agreement through compromise and intense deliberations was the only way ahead.

In her elaborate analysis, Sherwood-Randall attributes the failure of policy coordination to the “insurmountable differences” among the Allies stemming from their “divergent interests.”¹³² This is true as it pertains to the diversion of interests; however, there is one point missing which lies at the very essence of any alliance. Alliances are collective instruments and decisions are reached through deliberations with the final outcome serving the best interest of all the Allies. Indeed, differences can be insurmountable when the Allies are reluctant at different stages of the process to consult with the other members of the Alliance. In other words during the Suez Crisis, no one can really know what would have happened if the Allies operated from the beginning on a truly collective level on an issue whose ramifications were of concern to all members of NATO. While as she correctly points out that the communication between the U.S., the U.K., and France were well established and “no greater amount of consultation would necessarily have prevented the split within the Alliance,” the missing point is that

¹³⁰ "My colleagues and I are convinced that we must be ready, in the last resort, to use force to bring Nasser to his senses. For our part, we are prepared to do so. I have this morning instructed our Chiefs of Staff to prepare a military plan accordingly." United States. Dept. of State. Historical Office., *Foreign Relations of the United States: Suez Crisis July 26 - December 31, 1956*, (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1990), 10. Message from Prime Minister Eden to President Eisenhower.

¹³¹ Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, *Allies in Crisis: Meeting Global Challenges to Western Security*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 70.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 71.

NATO was not only comprised by the U.S., U.K., and France. The core of the argument, which is implicitly confirmed at a later stage (in the NAC Final Communiqué of December 11-14, 1956), is that there was no true consultation among *all* the members of the Alliance. If there was true consultation among the Allied nations, no one can really predict what could or would have happened. Historical examination of the ministerial communiqué of NAC's plenary meeting of December 11-14, 1956, in Paris, confirms this assertion. In paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, the communiqué reads:

In the meeting just ended, the Ministers *drew from the experience of past divergences in the policies* of NATO members the confirmation of the necessity for all members to develop effective political consultation and co-operation. They *reaffirmed* their determination to work together in unity and friendship to achieve the aims of the Alliance and to strengthen the Alliance in all its aspects as an indispensable agency for security and peace.

As a major forward step in the development of NATO in the non-military field, the Council approved the recommendations of the Committee of Three in their report to the Council. In doing so, the Council approved *wider and more intimate consultation among the member states on political matters*. The Council also approved arrangements to aid in the settlement of disputes among members and adopted measures for strengthening the organization of NATO internally and for further co-operation between members in certain economic and cultural fields. The report has been released by the Committee of Three.

The Council reviewed the international situation, *discussing frankly* the problems which confront the Atlantic Alliance. In the course of this discussion Ministers, *realizing that their views were in general agreement, decided that the detail should be worked out by continuous consultation* in the Council in the months ahead (all emphasis mine).¹³³

Further analyzing the communiqué, one can argue that it conveys the following messages:

¹³³ North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué [Internet] (NATO, 10/23/2000 1956, accessed 10/10 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c561214a.htm>. (emphasis mine).

- There was an identified failure of the consultation process (“...*drew from the experience of past divergence's in the policies...*”).
- The Allied nations “...*reaffirmed* their determination...” since divergence of actions and contradicting individual interests disconfirmed the unity of the Alliance.
- The Council confirmed that the only way to avoid such or similar incidents in the future and converge the interests of individual states in an aggregate manner is to adopt “...*wider and more intimate consultation among the member states on political matters.*”
- Finally democracies have in general the tendency to agree and thus provide the initial grounds necessary to develop further their accords. However, to reach the final goal of consensus “...*continuous consultation...*” is necessary.

Moreover, as stated above, this particular NAC meeting “approved the recommendations of the Committee of Three” wise men, which was providing the guidelines for further development of the political consultations of the Alliance.

D. THE OCTOBER 1973 (YOM KIPPUR¹³⁴) WAR, “DR. FALKEN”¹³⁵ AND NATO

1. Brief Historical Background

In early October 1973, supported logistically by the Soviet Union, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel in a surprising strike. The Israelis counterattacked, but they were in desperate need of outside assistance since the Arab strike had

¹³⁴ Yom Kippur is one of the most sacred Jewish holidays. Egypt and Syria launched their attack during the celebration of that holiday, October 6, 1973 which was selected by the Arabs “...for their own reasons, those being the state of the moon and tides in the Suez Canal ...”, Martin L. Van Creveld, *The Sword And The Olive: A Critical History Of The Israeli Defense Force*, 1st ed. (New York: Public Affairs, 1998), 224.

¹³⁵ Dr. Falken is a fictional individual, a scientist, according to the scenario of the movie “Wargames”, released in 1983. In that movie a global thermonuclear war was averted seconds before launch. The launch sequence was initiated due to a software malfunction of a super computer that supposedly controlled the launch of ICBMs. Dr Falken was the inventor of that computer.

inflicted serious losses, particularly on air assets.¹³⁶ The U.S. initiated a re-supply of arms to the Israelis, using at least at the outset of the crisis, The Soviets at the same time were reinforcing and provided support to the Arabs. However, in due course, only Portugal continued to facilitate the U.S. resupply effort, with all the other Allies refusing assistance.¹³⁷ The result was a massive-scale operation undertaken by the U.S. military, circumventing Europe in order to transport supplies to Israel. In October 22, 1973, a United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution¹³⁸ mandated a cease fire; but on the 24th the cease fire was broken and Moscow sent an urgent message to Washington calling for mutual ground deployment, and if Washington would not comply, Brezhnev stated that Moscow would unilaterally deploy Soviet forces on the ground. The message was received by Kissinger, though it was addressed from Brezhnev to President Nixon.¹³⁹ "Within hours of receiving the Soviet message, Kissinger put the global forces of the United States on nuclear alert. Around the world that night, American units were ordered to DEFCON III, the highest stage of readiness in peacetime. Under such circumstances, troops are placed on standby and await further orders. The Sixth Fleet, which was already stationed in the Mediterranean Sea at DEFCON II, remained poised to attack."¹⁴⁰ The road to escalation was open and Kissinger states that "[w]e were determined to resist by force if necessary the introduction of Soviet troops into the Middle East regardless of the pretext under which they arrived."¹⁴¹ Moreover, Kissinger who was appointed as

¹³⁶ Martin L. Van Creveld, *The Sword And The Olive: A Critical History Of The Israeli Defense Force*, 1st ed. (New York: Public Affairs, 1998), 233.

¹³⁷ The Netherlands was also willing to help the U.S. but it was geographically irrelevant.

¹³⁸ UN Security Council, Resolution 338: *Cease-Fire in the Middle East* (22 Oct 1973) [Internet] (UN Security Council, 1973, accessed 10/15 2004); available from <http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/288/65/IMG/NR028865.pdf?OpenElement>.

¹³⁹ L. Brezhnev, *National Security Archive* - Message from Brezhnev to Nixon, 24 October 1973, received at State Department, 10:00 p.m. [Internet] (George Washington University, 1973, accessed 10/15 2004); available from <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-71.pdf>.

¹⁴⁰ Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, *Allies in Crisis: Meeting Global Challenges to Western Security*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 141.

¹⁴¹ Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, (Boston: Little Brown, 1982), 580.

both Secretary of State *and* National Security Advisor convened the “Washington Special Action Group (WSAG)--a special [National Security Council] NSC sub-committee responsible for handling crisis situations” which prepared a response¹⁴² “to Brezhnev’s letter that would go out under the president’s name, but which Nixon did not see at the time.”¹⁴³ That letter rejected Soviet demands for “troops on the ground” as “not appropriate” and called for the two parties to exert their influence to “ensure compliance” of the Egyptians and the Israelis with the Security Council mandates. The alert was cancelled and Brezhnev, referring for the first time to the U.S. DEFCON III, mentioned that he was surprised, but nonetheless, that he realized that it was used as a “means of pressure on the Soviet Union,” which he replied, would fail to “intimidate us.”¹⁴⁴

2. Consultation (lack thereof) in NATO

During this period, the Alliance was by and large kept in the dark. The Allies were sporadically briefed and the first disclosed¹⁴⁵ deliberations show that the U.S. permanent representative, Donald Rumsfeld outlined the situation

¹⁴² National Security Archive, *National Security Archive - The October War and U.S. Policy* [Internet] (George Washington University, 2003, accessed 10/15 2004); available from <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/index.htm>. For Nixon’s letter to Brezhnev see: Nixon, *National Security Archive - Nixon to Brezhnev, 25 October 1973, delivered to Soviet Embassy, 5:40 a.m.* [Internet] (George Washington University, 1973, accessed 10/15 2004); available from <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-73.pdf>.

¹⁴³ Nixon was heavily preoccupied with the Watergate scandal and its repercussions pertinent to his presidency. For further details see Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, (Boston: Little Brown, 1982), 72 - 81 and 581-582. For the letter prepared, that would go under Nixon’s name see: National Security Archive, *National Security Archive - The October War and U.S. Policy* [Internet] (George Washington University, 2003, accessed 10/15 2004); available from <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/index.htm>.

¹⁴⁴ L. Brezhnev, *National Security Archive - Hotline Message from Brezhnev to Nixon, 26 October 1973, complete translation received 29 October 1973* [Internet] (George Washington University, 1973, accessed 10/15 2004); available from <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-83.pdf>.

¹⁴⁵ The *National Security Archive* of George Washington University is at present the only source providing primary documents with pertinent information about the incidents of that period. Most of the documents are disclosed under the Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA). Unfortunately, Volume two of the Foreign Relations of the United States (1973-1976), as of the writing of this thesis, has not yet been published.

looking to NATO “partners for understanding and support.”¹⁴⁶ In the same part of his telegram to the State Department, Rumsfeld called for Alliance solidarity and stated that the U.S. would not take actions unilaterally “though it can,”¹⁴⁷ also stating that the U.S. was re-supplying Israel. Furthermore he asserted that the actions constituted a test for the Alliance in the eyes of Soviets, East Europeans, Arabs, and others.”¹⁴⁸ Moreover he “called upon NATO partners for coordination of policies” on the Middle East issue.

From the second part of the telegram,¹⁴⁹ one can infer that the Allies were leaning sympathetically towards the U.S. position, that there were no major objections raised, nor any other discussion pertinent to the détente policies followed by the Allies individually or collectively. Moreover, the “spirit” of the views exchanged exhibited solidarity and cohesion. Even the French representative, while awaiting further instructions, was conciliatory. However, the U.S. airlift had commenced, according to Kissinger, after Nixon’s endorsement¹⁵⁰ on October 9-10. Moreover, the next official document that relates to NATO is the Department of State dispatch¹⁵¹ to the U.S. permanent representative that instructed Rumsfeld to inform NATO about DEFCON III “...on a completely

¹⁴⁶ U.S. Mission to NATO, *National Security Archive* - U.S. Mission to NATO Cable 4936 to Department of State, "NATO Implications of the Middle East Conflict: NAC Meeting of October 16, 1973," 16 October 1973. [Internet] (George Washington University, 1973, accessed 10/15 2004); available from <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-32a.pdf>.

¹⁴⁷ U.S. Mission to NATO, *National Security Archive* - U.S. Mission to NATO Cable 5179 to State Department, "U.S. Action Regarding Middle East", 26 October 1973 [Internet] (George Washington University, 1973, accessed 10/15 2004); available from <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-79a.pdf>.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, (Boston: Little Brown, 1982), 491-496.

¹⁵¹ U.S. Department of State, *National Security Archive* - Department of State Cable 210450 to U.S. Mission, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 25 October 1973. [Internet] (George Washington University, 1973, accessed 10/15 2004); available from <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-74.pdf>.

confidential basis...”¹⁵² However, the Allies had learned about the nuclear alert from the newspapers, since the information had been leaked, just as the rest of the world had learned it.¹⁵³ In any case, the Alliance once more realized the drawbacks of a lack of consultation and the negative consequences on Allied coordinated action. At Brussels, the NAC convened and Rumsfeld reported the course of the deliberations with two messages addressed to the U.S. Department of State.¹⁵⁴ These two telegrams eloquently convey the frustration of the Allies towards the U.S. for the latter’s decision “to consult the friends *after* it has consulted with the enemies.”¹⁵⁵ Rumsfeld responded during NAC’s lunch that the Allies had “abundant opportunities” to make their views known,¹⁵⁶ a point which is plausible, since the airlift was known, as well as the general course of events. Moreover, he raised the issue that there should not be any complaints raised but

¹⁵² U.S. Department of State, *National Security Archive* - Department of State Cable 210450 to U.S. Mission, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 25 October 1973. [Internet] (George Washington University, 1973, accessed 10/15 2004); available from <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-74.pdf>.

¹⁵³ With the exception of the U.K. the ambassador of which was briefed by Kissinger on the nuclear alert at 01.03 of October 25, in the context of the “special relationship” all the other allied nations were kept in the dark, due to the fact that the call to the Soviet bluff had to be as realistic as possible and the “Soviets to pick up [the] readiness measures themselves and not through allied leaks...”. Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, (Boston: Little Brown, 1982), 590.

¹⁵⁴ U.S. Mission to NATO, *National Security Archive* - U.S. Mission to NATO Cable 5179 to State Department, "U.S. Action Regarding Middle East", 26 October 1973 [Internet] (George Washington University, 1973, accessed 10/15 2004); available from <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-79a.pdf>; U.S. Mission to NATO, *National Security Archive* - U.S. Mission to NATO Cable 5184 to State Department, "U.S. Action Regarding Middle East," 26 October 1973 [Internet] (George Washington University, 1973, accessed 10/15 2004); available from <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-79b.pdf>.

¹⁵⁵ The Belgian permanent representative’s (De Staercke) wording when he raised a rather rhetorical question during the NAC meeting was “...will consultations between friends necessarily have to take place after consultations with the enemies?... .” It emanated from the French ambassador’s moves after taking the floor: “...De Rose (sic) went on to say that last week the council made it clear that it was being asked to undertake the difficult task of trying to follow the U.S. recommended course of action without the necessary exchange of informatio (sic). ...De Rose(sic) rhetorically (sic) asked ‘is this the implementation of a policy which might be called the policy of June 22, 1973?...Will the U.S. in time of crisis seek a closer consultation with the Soviet Union than with its Allies?’” Moreover, the U.K. representative (speaking on a personal basis) attributed the problem on “...striking a balance between getting results and sharing information with the Allies. U.S. Mission to NATO, *National Security Archive* - U.S. Mission to NATO Cable 5179 to State Department, "U.S. Action Regarding Middle East", 26 October 1973 [Internet] (George Washington University, 1973, accessed 10/15 2004); available from <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-79a.pdf>.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

rather “specific suggestions for improving [the] Alliance’s consultation procedures”.¹⁵⁷ However, he did not make clear whether such suggestions would be on a technical basis or a political one, since the political aspects of the consultation process inside the Alliance were addressed by the committee of the three foreign ministers in 1956 and on the margin by the “Harmel report”. Rumsfeld did not clarify whether the U.S. wished to create a new committee to readdress the issues of political consultation. Moreover, there is no indication that any other representative raised this issue to the U.S. delegate. The U.S. representative also remarked that the “U.S. moves seemed to have the desired effect on the Soviets and thought the Allies might have found some satisfaction in that. Rumsfeld went on saying on personal basis that he makes “no apologies for U.S. actions whatsoever.”¹⁵⁸ However, the U.S. representative failed to address what would have been the course of events for the Alliance but also for each country individually, in the unfortunate case the events had not unfolded as they had and the U.S. moves had an undesired effect on the Soviets. In other words, what would have been the case if the Allies were confronted with a dire *fait accompli*? This issue, from what is known, was not raised by the other representatives.

As mentioned above, Kissinger criticized his decision to elevate nuclear readiness; however, at another point, Kissinger advocated for such a decision since as he correctly pointed out, the crux of the objection from the Allied standpoint had not so much to do with “...timing as to the absence of opportunity to affect [the U.S.] decision.”¹⁵⁹ In addition to this point, he cynically adds that the situation was such that “...we could not have accepted a judgment different from our own.”¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁷ U.S. Mission to NATO, *National Security Archive* - U.S. Mission to NATO Cable 5184 to State Department, "U.S. Action Regarding Middle East," 26 October 1973 [Internet] (George Washington University, 1973, accessed 10/15 2004); available from <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-79b.pdf>.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, (Boston: Little Brown, 1982), 713.

In any case, the Alliance “rebounded” and during the NAC’s meeting of June 19, 1974, the Allies published the Declaration on Atlantic Relations,¹⁶¹ known as the Ottawa Declaration. Bitter rhetoric receded and once more the Alliance reaffirmed that the consultation norm should be abided and “co-operation and mutual trust” should be maintained. Additionally, the Allies expressed their firm resolve

...to keep each other fully informed and to strengthen the practice of frank and timely consultations by all means which may be appropriate on matters relating to their common interests as members of the Alliance, bearing in mind that these interests can be affected by events in other areas of the world ...¹⁶²

The essence of this declaration is that the Allies recognized once more, on a “lessons learned” basis, that timely consultation is the essence of the Alliance, even in the presence of a tangible enemy, and in particular, on issues raised outside the trans-Atlantic area. Moreover, the Allies implicitly recognized the impact of technology and the acceleration that it could induce on issues of Allied interest. Thus, they underlined that “all means which may be appropriate” must be employed to implement the consultation norm and avoid unnecessary “stalling” in such issues.

The next major issue for the Alliance would come through an unprecedented event that was by and large unpredictable or considered unfeasible. The demise of the Soviet Union would induce new allied policies and would reorient the Alliance to adjust its strategies in a initial climate of ambiguity for the future since the precipitating events of 1989 caught the Alliance unaware.

¹⁶⁰ Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, (Boston: Little Brown, 1982), 713. It is interesting to follow the intellectual struggle in Kissinger’s mind; on one time he swings towards a closer cooperation while on another he rebukes such notion by justifying his actions on the premises of the frenetic pace of events.

¹⁶¹ North Atlantic Council, *Declaration on Atlantic Relations* [Internet] (NATO, 10/23/2000 1974, accessed 10/12 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c740618b.htm>.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, par. 11.

E. THE END OF COLD WAR AND ARTICLES 4, 5 AND 6

Although the issues raised from the radical change of the strategic environment with the demise of the Soviet Union constitute a separate study in their own right, it would be an oversight not to examine how the Articles in question have evolved during the decade from 1991 to 2001. German Unification, NATO's expansion eastwards to cover the security vacuum created by the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the political evolution of Europe, and the crises in the Balkans are only a few of the issues that have shaped the Allied agenda after the abrupt end of the Cold War.

The Alliance, in its new Strategic Concept¹⁶³ of 1991, addressed the issues of "...crises affecting the security of allied [member nations],"¹⁶⁴ as well as the management of such predicaments. The pledge which is embodied in Article 5 and provides the guarantees of collective defense was now enlarged to include threats with a greater likelihood of occurrence but of a different nature than those during the Cold War. During the Cold War the main threat was stemming from a Soviet attack. In the new era such likelihood became an almost inexistent possibility. The Alliance contemplated to counter regional crises which do not require full military mobilization as any article 5 operation. Thus NATO adopted the concept of non-Article 5 operations. Moreover, the new Strategic Concept formulated the rationale for the departure of the former NATO organization, oriented towards deterrence and countering the threats of the Cold War. The Alliance initiated a process aiming to the adoption of forces with "enhanced flexibility and mobility and an assured capability for augmentation when necessary."¹⁶⁵ Interpreted further, NATO was adjusting to the new strategic environment by dropping its nuclear forces and adopting reductions of its

¹⁶³ North Atlantic Council, *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept* [Internet] (NATO, 1991, accessed 9/28 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911107a.htm#II>.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, par. 19.

¹⁶⁵ North Atlantic Council, *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept* [Internet] (NATO, 1991, accessed 9/28 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911107a.htm#II>, par. 46.

conventional forces; however, the latter were to be restructured to handle contemporary threats of the “indivisible security”¹⁶⁶ of the Alliance.

Additionally, one can argue that there is a consistent pattern that most of the contemporary security issues are more or less out-of-area issues, in which the “consultation machinery” provides the necessary mechanisms for policy coordination. “The new challenges to Allied security arose almost entirely well beyond the borders of NATO countries.”¹⁶⁷ For example, during the Gulf War of 1991, the Alliance, through Article 4, made possible the involvement and use of Allied assets. “Twelve of the 16 NATO Allies provided forces to the coalition. The United States was able to draw on the military infrastructure NATO had created over the years. Britain and France dispatched troops to the Gulf while other Allies facilitated the transit of U.S. aircraft through their logistical support. In the course of the buildup and the subsequent rapid victory over Iraq, the kinds of transatlantic tensions that had been visible during much of the Cold War were in abeyance.”¹⁶⁸

Furthermore, “[t]he outbreaks of regional ethnic conflicts on NATO’s periphery...”¹⁶⁹ and specifically the former Yugoslavia crises, while they did not “touch” the Alliance’s concrete pledges emanating from Article 5, [they were] “near” out-of-area issues that could potentially affect Allied nations. “The action taken by NATO..., under U.S. leadership [in Bosnia], suggests that the Allies had finally concluded that their core interests, [pertinent to security], were threatened and that action was imperative....”¹⁷⁰ However, there lies a subtle but noteworthy

¹⁶⁶ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security*, (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1997), 21.

¹⁶⁷ Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic community: The Transatlantic Bargain reconsidered*, (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 90.

¹⁶⁸ Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance*, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2004), 111.

¹⁶⁹ Gustav Schmidt, ed., *A History of NATO - The First Fifty Years*, 3 vols., vol. 1 (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 199.

¹⁷⁰ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security*, (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1997), 23.

difference between Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations. The procedure for the former and what it means for the Allies is well defined, as elaborated above. For non Article 5 operations however, there is no defined procedure except what may be derived from political consultation. “The response of the Alliance in such cases [non-Article 5 operations] must be determined by individual, independent national judgements, all of which must be at last permissive of the proposed action, if not actively supported.”¹⁷¹ In order to coordinate the necessary responses, the Allies apply the procedures of political consultation to reach such decisions.¹⁷²

Regional outbreaks of ethnic violence have brought the Alliance face to face with the starkly contrasting military capabilities of the Allies. While this has been a recurring theme since 1952,¹⁷³ the Kosovo air campaign of 1999 confirmed that, despite the fact that the Cold War had been over for almost a decade, most of the Allied nation’s military capabilities had not transformed to meet the new challenges. “The high-intensity air campaign against Serbia over the Kosovo crisis demonstrated how important collective defense instruments, such as high-tech air capabilities can be to non-Article 5 operations.”¹⁷⁴ Many factors can be attributed to the causes of such delays, however, there is evidence that the Alliance and the individual member nations, through recent military restructuring, are adapting to the new challenges.

¹⁷¹ Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic community: The Transatlantic Bargain reconsidered*, (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 108.

¹⁷² One tangible example of such coordination can be invoked by referring to Greece’s role during the Kosovo air campaign and the subsequent deployment and support of KFOR. Greece for strategic reasons, which fall outside the scope of this study, as one of the neighboring countries, did not want to actively engage in the air campaign. However, she supported actively the Alliance by providing airspace clearance, manning and supporting NATO AWACS aircraft and so on. Moreover, Greece’s northern port of Thessalonica was used as a major transport hub for the subsequent operations in the area.

¹⁷³ During the 1952 Lisbon Summit “an integrated coalition force under a supreme allied commander had been created; alliance-wide force goals had been set and the groundwork laid for an annual review of the members’ compliance with those goals;...” Wallace J. Thies, *Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-shifting in NATO*, (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), 72.

¹⁷⁴ Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic community: The Transatlantic Bargain reconsidered*, (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 113.

Finally, it is most important to underline the fact that the new Strategic Concept of 1999 explicitly stipulated, as the cornerstone of the Alliance, its collective defense and the reinforcement of the trans-Atlantic link.¹⁷⁵ In this way, this detailed document reaffirms the core function of the Alliance upon which all military and political capabilities are built upon.

F. CONCLUSION

NATO is an exceptional Alliance in history. It has developed highly elaborate and specialized mechanisms to serve the interests of its members. During the early years of NATO and due to the unsettled conditions after the end of the Second World War, the Alliance identified the issues that would preoccupy the Allies in the future. This process of developing the mechanisms that would eventually be utilized to address future challenges was worked through repeatedly, culminating in the Report of the Three Wise Men, which has provided the basis on which the Alliance continues to function to this day

Since its inception the Alliance has faced challenges that have proven most acute when *three conditions are met*:

- a security issue arises outside of the well defined area of Article 6,
- the Allies do not consult or consult on a restricted basis,
- unilateral action is finally undertaken and presented in the Alliance as a *fait accompli*.

The conditions above apply in both the Suez Crisis and the October War. Contrasting these two distinct cases one can conclude at the following:

- The 1973 crisis occurred in the same region, which in NATO terms was an out-of-area issue.
- The main protagonists of the crisis were relatively identical in both cases.

¹⁷⁵ North Atlantic Council, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept* [Internet] (NAC, 4/23/1999 1999, accessed 9/28 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>. par., 4.

- Both superpowers were engaged in the crisis; however the intensity of their engagement varied in proportion to the interests they believed to be at stake.
- In terms of the NATO consultation norm, the two crises reveal a subtle but noteworthy difference: in the Suez Crisis the process initially faltered and finally collapsed. During the Yom Kippur War, the consultation process, in an Alliance-wide context, was nonexistent from the beginning. Nonetheless the outcome remains the same: unilateral actions and non-consultation compliance led to a crisis among the Allies. After both incidents, the Alliance restated and reaffirmed its unity both in the intra-allied and foreign fields.

During the 1980s NATO managed to win the Cold War in a rather abrupt and unexpected manner.

The Western victory in the Cold War was in part the triumph of coalition diplomacy. In the end, persistence and negotiation among the Allies paid off. Compromise kept the Alliance together and the process of debate helped to legitimize it.¹⁷⁶

NATO realized early enough the new challenges created and articulated a novel strategy to counter them. Moreover, it developed concepts within the Alliance to cooperate with former adversaries. Additionally, NATO survived the end of the Cold War because it managed to be recognized as the “...most reliable mechanism for ensuring security in Europe...”¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁶ Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century*, (London: Atlantic Books, 2003), 125.

¹⁷⁷ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security*, (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1997), 51.

IV. NATO'S EVOLUTION FROM 2000 TO 2004 IN THE CONTEXT OF ARTICLES 4, 5 AND 6 OF THE WASHINGTON TREATY OF 1949

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will provide an analysis of the Alliance and its evolution under the prism of the events of September 11, 2001, with particular attention to the application of Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. It will also examine the out-of-area issues, and how these issues may transform the role of NATO. From that perspective, the pretext of the contemporary Allied policies can be traced back to the 1999 Strategic Concept. This text can be seen as an endeavor to extend Allied security functions, since it contains an articulate form of the NATO's new roles. Article 24 of the Strategic Concept reads:

Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability affecting the Alliance. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, co ordination of their efforts including their responses to risks of this kind.¹⁷⁸

This paragraph provides the guarantees that the Alliance is committed to the Washington Treaty of 1949 as its basic premise. In addition, the second line's "[h]owever," introduces the potential threats that Allied leadership has contemplated for the future.

¹⁷⁸ North Atlantic Council, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept* [Internet] (NAC, 4/23/1999 1999, accessed 9/28 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>.

One can argue that the 1999 Strategic Concept provided a double-tiered defense policy¹⁷⁹ for the Alliance and closer examination supports such an assertion:

- Tier One is the reaffirmation of the guarantees provided by Article 5. The Alliance remains committed to the self defense pledges of the Washington Treaty through the elaborate mechanisms established in the Euro-Atlantic area.
- Tier Two affirms the political will and the military capability of the Alliance to deal with broader threats affecting the stability of the Allies.

The aforementioned paragraph of the Strategic Concept of 1999 embraces all three Articles that this study seeks to examine. Consultation is considered the ultimate political tool for the Allies to reach consensus with respect to “risks of wider nature.” The main threat of the Cold War had subsided, despite the fact that residual threats of a much smaller scale remained in place.¹⁸⁰ Moreover, while the Alliance was, in general, getting ready to counter the threats of the meta-post Cold War era, the terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, set the stage for the entry into a new strategic landscape.

B. 2001 AND BEYOND

The whole planet watched, with abhorrence, the attacks on the twin towers in New York and the Pentagon. The attacks not only were to transform

¹⁷⁹ At this point it must be noted that the double-tier notion has nothing to do with the dual-track policy despite the fact that it may produce relevant connotations. Dual-track refers to two different strategies one for sustaining the appropriate military capacity to withstand pressure stemming from the defense challenges of the adversary and the other to reciprocate or instigate and sustain motions that are initiated in another field like those of arms-control. Double-Tier refers to the defense posture of NATO: on one hand capable of reassuring the collective defense in the Euro-Atlantic area, and on the other to be ready to respond to new defense challenges stemming from “risks of wider nature.”

¹⁸⁰ The Alliance had since the Rome Summit of 1991 established cooperation mechanisms to promote its relationship with the former members of the Warsaw Pact and in particular Russia. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council later to be transformed in the Euro Atlantic Cooperation Council provided the basis for such cooperation. While the Allied interests do not allow for Russia to be seen as a member of NATO, it was to the Alliance’s interests not to have alienated Russia. The Eurasian “giant” had to be reassured that NATO’s expansion was not to constitute a threat towards the Russian defense. Moreover, the NACC/EACC was established as the necessary forum for the institutionalization this cooperative relationship.

America but the Alliance as well. For the first time in its history, NATO invoked Article 5, and the Allies came together to defend the U.S. As many scholars and policy makers have noted,¹⁸¹ Article 5 was articulated vaguely, as it was necessary to balance between the automaticity of the involvement of the Allies and the sovereign rights of the Allied nations to declare war. Also, the Article was serving as an instrument of deterrence since it implied during the inception of the Treaty that the "...defenseless Western (sic) Europe [was to be protected by] the powerful United States ..."¹⁸² As Osgood points out:

The founders of the Treaty, wary of America's history of isolation and conscious of Europe's dependence upon American intervention in two world wars, believed that a truly entangling alliance, formally binding the United States within the mutual obligations of several states, was essential to make America's commitment to come to the defense of Europe convincing to the potential aggressor and to the potential victims of aggression as well.

The attacks of September 11 triggered supportive reactions from the European Allies, and in their first responses the members of the Alliance expressed their solidarity to their transatlantic ally. The NAC statement from the deliberations of September 12, 2001, reads *inter alia*:

The North Atlantic Council met tonight to express its solidarity with the United States of America at this moment of great tragedy and mourning...All Allies stand united in their determination to combat this scourge. At this critical moment, the United States can rely on its 18 Allies in North America and Europe for assistance and support. NATO solidarity remains the essence of our Alliance. Our message to the people of the

United States is that we are with you. Our message to those who perpetrated these unspeakable crimes is equally clear: you will not get away with it.¹⁸³

¹⁸¹ For example Lawrence Kaplan writes "...the elliptical language of Article 5, [was] designed by American policymakers to allow the United States to choose its own terms of engagement..." Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance*, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2004), 135. Also see Dean Acheson, *Present at the creation; my years in the State Department*, 1st ed. (New York.: Norton, 1969), 280-281.

¹⁸² Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance*, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2004), 135.

¹⁸³ North Atlantic Council, Statement by the North Atlantic Council [Internet] (2001, accessed 9/28 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-122e.htm>.

The culmination of the consultations between the Allies came the same day when the Alliance formally invoked Article 5. Along with other relevant stipulations, the statement of the NAC read:

...The Council agreed that if it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all...¹⁸⁴

What is of particular importance is that the Alliance support was contingent on hard evidence that the attack came from the outside. Once those responsible for the attacks were identified, action could be taken against them, even in the form of military operations. Additionally, when all evidence pointing to Al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden's notorious organization was confirmed, there would not be any issue raised to equate this international terrorist network and the fight against it as a fight against all Islam in general.

Moreover, NATO sought to get Russian support and in the statement issued after the meeting of the permanent joint council between Russia and NATO, the former pledged to fight against terrorism along with the U.S. and the Alliance.¹⁸⁵ This is perhaps a statement of equal importance to the politics involved after the attack since it not only commits Russia in a joint endeavour with the Alliance against terrorism, but also provides an excuse for the Russians to combat domestic terrorism. In other words, it is a statement that, besides the rhetoric of expressed solidarity, served the interests of both parties. A parallel press statement was issued after a session of the NATO-Ukraine commission.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁴ North Atlantic Council, Statement by the North Atlantic Council [Internet] (2001, accessed 9/28 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-122e.htm>

¹⁸⁵ NATO, Press Statement - *Meeting in extraordinary session of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council at Ambassadorial level* [Internet] (2001, accessed 9/28 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p010913e.htm>.

¹⁸⁶ NATO, *Statement by the NATO-Ukraine Commission* [Internet] (2001, accessed 9/28 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-126e.htm>.

All empirical evidence shows that the deliberations of the Article 5 invocation were conducted at the permanent representatives' level. Considering the magnitude of the commitment and the policy ramifications, the decision was reached in a relatively short period of time. There was no necessity to call for a meeting at a higher level since the solidarity was self evident. However, while the Allies were more than willing to provide help to the U.S. "as deemed necessary," but America was apparently not prepared to accept it." A French diplomat told *JDW*, "We would need to have some kind of request from the U.S. and so far we have no idea what they want to do and whether they want a joint response." Furthermore, "...But the Allies stand ready to provide assistance. Each ally individually or in consultation will make its own assessment about what it can provide, but already everyone is committed to respond to such a request."¹⁸⁷ Public opinion in Europe was overwhelmingly sympathetic towards the U.S. For example, in France, "96% of French adults said they felt a sense of solidarity with Americans following the attacks, with nearly three-fourths (72%) describing their sentiment as one of "complete" solidarity."¹⁸⁸

As mentioned, one day after the attacks, on September 12, 2001, the Alliance declared that it was ready to fulfil the pledge of collective defense. However, it took 14 days for the U.S. to respond to the Allied declaration and then the U.S. fell short in sharing evidence to prove that the attacks were directed from abroad. On September 26, 2001, the "Deputy U.S. Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, during an informal meeting of NATO defence ministers in Brussels, "...was not ready to provide...evidence, and offered few details of the investigations into the attacks or possible military responses... A NATO official stressed that while expectations were high before the meeting, which for security reasons was transferred to Brussels from Naples, it

¹⁸⁷ Luke Hill, "NATO rallies behind USA, but denies planning military action," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 9/29/199 2001.

¹⁸⁸ Richard Burkholder, Reaction to the Attacks on America [Internet] (*The Gallup Organization*, 2001, accessed 10/22 2004); available from <http://institution.gallup.com/documentView.aspx?tab=document&strID=4903>.

probably was not the time to invoke Article 5.”¹⁸⁹ As Philip H. Gordon points out: “Wolfowitz’s presentation reflected a longstanding mindset in the Pentagon and much of the Republican Party that saw U.S. leadership as essential and European Allied support as politically useful but not particularly significant militarily. In this case, it was reinforced by what many Americans saw as a key “lesson” of Kosovo. Whereas many in Europe saw the Kosovo air campaign as excessively dominated by the United States and American generals, most Americans - particularly within the military - saw just the opposite: excessive European meddling, with French politicians and European lawyers interfering with efficient targeting and bombing runs, and compromising operational security.”¹⁹⁰ In any case

On October 4, after having been presented with credible proof from US officials that the attacks were indeed sponsored from abroad, NATO Allies agreed to the U.S. request. The measures included:

- enhanced intelligence sharing, both bilaterally and within NATO;
- blanket overflight clearances for US and other NATO aircraft;
- assistance to Allies and other states that might be subject to terrorist threats as a result of their cooperation with the United States;
- measures to provide increased security for US facilities in Europe;
- backfilling certain allied assets in the NATO area that might be required elsewhere for the campaign against terrorism;
- access for the United States and other Allies to ports and airfields on NATO territory;
- the deployment of standing NATO naval forces to the Eastern Mediterranean; and

¹⁸⁹ Luke Hill, "USA yet to offer NATO evidence on attacks," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 10/03/2001 2001.

¹⁹⁰ Philip H Gordon, "NATO after 11 September," *Survival*, 43 Winter (2001): 92.

- the deployment of NATO airborne early warning-and-control systems (AWACS) to US airspace so that American AWACS could be used abroad.¹⁹¹

1. The Afghanistan Campaign

For the European Allies and the NATO structure, one could have argued that “*alea jacta est*”; however, the U.S. was intending to base its policies and military strategies in utilizing selective resources, and not collective resources as provided by NATO. The U.S. administration’s strategic concept was based on “clear objectives ...determin[ation] to achieve them, ... [and] strong leadership...”¹⁹² but outside the commitments of formal Alliances. Formation of a “coalition of the willing” would be the preferred path for the U.S. leaders and policy makers since “...wars can benefit from [them], to be sure. But they should not be fought by committee. The mission must determine the coalition, and the coalition must not determine the mission. If it does, the mission will be dumbed down to the lowest common denominator.”¹⁹³ One can argue that the U.S. administration was reluctant to bind in a collective effort through NATO. “Ironically, however, it was the American rejection of European military involvement in the Afghanistan campaign that annoyed Europeans at the same time that American leaders were pressing for the Allies’ help.”¹⁹⁴ Although the fact that the American side had a plausible argument derived from the Kosovo operations, the mixed messages that the U.S. sent, further exacerbated the tensions of the transatlantic link. Despite the uneasiness caused by the rhetoric and the actions of the U.S., the Allies contributed a broad spectrum of assistance, ranging from facilities, materiel, overflight and landing rights, as well as, more

¹⁹¹ Philip H Gordon, "NATO after 11 September," *Survival*, 43 Winter (2001): 93. The author cites the measures as a result of interviews with NATO officials.

¹⁹² Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy*, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2003), 81.

¹⁹³ Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary Rumsfeld Speaks on "21st Century Transformation" of U.S. Armed Forces(United States Department of Defense, 2001, accessed 10/22 2004); available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020131-secdef.html>.

¹⁹⁴ Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance*, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2004), 136.

tangible force deployments and engagements during the Afghanistan campaign. Lord Robertson, former NATO Secretary General, further elaborates on this issue:

But the United States is a part of the NATO alliance, and invoking Article 5 gave [to the U.S.] some useful options. Once the decision was made to launch the Afghanistan campaign, a switch clicked and the United States had only to ask for things like the use of alliance airspace, ports, and harbors, or the deployment of NATO AWACS to the United States. These things may look small, but they were actually fundamental building blocks to the campaign. In my opinion, NATO's invocation of Article 5 also allowed the United States to build its antiterror coalition much faster because the full authority of the NATO alliance was behind the effort.¹⁹⁵

2. The Iraq Crisis

At the Prague Summit in 2002, Allied leaders expressed "...their pledge [of] our full support for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 and call on Iraq to comply fully and immediately with this and all relevant UN Security Council resolutions."¹⁹⁶ The U.S. however, purported to be convinced of Iraq's connection with international terrorism, and was inclined to the use of force to topple the Baghdad regime directly.¹⁹⁷ The European Allies, on the other hand, with France and Germany in the front line, were opposed to such actions on the grounds that more time was necessary for the UN inspectors and to further strengthen the UN weapons inspection regime. However, "[in] mid-February the debate spilled over from the United Nations into NATO.

The Bush administration sought to convince Turkey to allow U.S. troops access to Turkish military bases, from which a possible attack on northern Iraq could be launched. Thus, it proposed that NATO agree to

¹⁹⁵ Cited in Christian Tuschhoff, "Why NATO is Still Relevant," *International Politics*, 40 Mar (2003): 40.

¹⁹⁶ NATO, *Prague Summit Statement on Iraq Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague on 21 November 2002* [Internet] (2002, accessed 9/28 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-133e.htm>.

¹⁹⁷ For further analysis see Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy*, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2003), ch. 9.

transfer Patriot missile systems, AWACs reconnaissance planes, and other assets to defend Turkey in the event of a possible attack from Iraq. Once again, France and Germany (supported by Belgium) blocked the proposed action, on the grounds that it prejudged the inevitability of war with Iraq. Under pressure from the U.S. and other NATO Allies, and after days of bitter negotiations, Germany and Belgium eventually agreed to the proposed measures, which were adopted within the NATO Defence Planning Council, of which France is not a member.”¹⁹⁸ Notwithstanding the fact that the war in Iraq was swift and fast, it underlined the rift in transatlantic relations and the different approaches adopted by the Allies. Once more, an out-of-area issue, unilateral action, and lack of adequate consultation (albeit inferred by presumptive evidence) had led the Alliance to a crisis.

C. MILITARY ADAPTATION

The events of September 11 bore out the fears voiced in the Strategic Concept of 1999. The attacks confirmed, in the worst possible way, the perceptions of planners and policy makers with respect to future risks. However, the next logical question to be considered concerns the level of Allied preparedness to counter such threats. NATO had initiated its restructuring from the static defense scheme dictated by the Cold War to the novel arrangements necessary for the new era. The Washington Summit of 1999 could not afford to introduce the new Strategic Concept for the Alliance without providing the necessary strategy to achieve policy goals. The Allied

¹⁹⁸ John Peterson and Mark A. Pollack, *Europe, America, Bush: Transatlantic Relations in the Twenty First Century*, (London ; New York: Routledge, 2003), 136; See also Luke Hill, "NATO crisis over Iraq continues," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 2/19/2003 2003. For a complete record of the consultation process pertinent to the invocation of article 4 by Turkey see NATO, *Consultations on measures to protect Turkey* [Internet] (2003, accessed 9/28 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2003/02-february/e0210a.htm>. On the issue of Turkey's protection the position of France Germany and Belgium was based on the logic that the three did not want to give the wrong signals that NATO was involving in a by and large unilateral military action undertaken by the U.S. According to French officials if Turkey was in any way threatened by Iraq "France would be the first to contribute" to the protection of the former. However, one must also take account the spin created by domestic influence, especially in countries like France where there is a large Muslim minority. "French Defence Minister Michele Alliot-Marie warned that a war in Iraq could lead to upheaval among Muslims and could also give other nations a justification for launching pre-emptive strikes. "I think this is extremely dangerous because it could open all sorts of possibilities.'" Luke Hill, Gregorz Holdanowicz, Ian Kemp, "USA presses NATO to provide increased readiness forces," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 10/2/2002 2002.

nations concurred in a procedure coined as the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI),¹⁹⁹ which set forth new restructuring of the Allied military. In sum, the DCI made provisions for the non-Article 5 operations and the demands they dictate, including also other “[f]uture Alliance military operations...”²⁰⁰ Moreover, the DCI text calls the Allies to develop further their interoperability, as well as, their capacity for “rapid deployment of significant forces outside national territory, or for extended sustainment of operations and protection of forces far from home bases.”²⁰¹ Such operations “far from home bases” obviously can be considered not only operations like those conducted by the Alliance in the “near-abroad” air space of Yugoslavia and Kosovo, but also much further from the limits of the Euro-Atlantic area. This is implicitly stated in the DCI communiqué since the latter puts strong emphasis on the “... deployability and mobility of Alliance forces, on their sustainability and logistics, their survivability and effective engagement capability, and on command and control and information systems.”²⁰² Furthermore, during the NATO defense ministers’ follow-on meeting held in Ottawa in 1999, except for stressing the importance of “a strong transatlantic link,”²⁰³ the Allies emphasized their willingness to restructure the Alliance for the “common good.”²⁰⁴

The deficiencies and delays of the DCI, as well as the deepening gap,²⁰⁵ created the necessity of formulating another strategy for addressing the issues that rose tangibly during the first Gulf War and the Kosovo air

¹⁹⁹ North Atlantic Council, *Defence Capabilities Initiative* [Internet] (NAC, 4/25/1999 1999, accessed 9/28 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99s069e.htm>.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Sharon Hobson, "NATO Allies agree need to upgrade capability," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 9/29/199 1999.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ There is abundant bibliography on the issue and one can cite many references such as the David C. Gompert, Richard L. Kugler, and Martin C. Libicki, *Mind The Gap: Promoting a Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs*, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press : [Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O., distributor], 1999),.

campaign.²⁰⁶ The answer came during the Prague Summit, where the Allies at the end of the day, decided to proceed forward in three interconnected measures:

- Streamline the Allied command structure to become more resilient and to accommodate the ramifications of the next wave of expansion;²⁰⁷
- Establish the NATO Response Force (NRF);²⁰⁸
- Adopt a roadmap of modernization and force reorganization, namely the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC).

Since then NATO Allies have focused on the reorganization of the command structure and the adoption of more robust and technologically advanced systems. Moreover, the Alliance took measures and is implementing strategies for advancing interoperability and deployability of Allied assets, aiming to close the capabilities gap and counter the palpable and emerging threats, asymmetrical conventional and strategic.

D. ANALYSIS

Terrorism, the main threat that spurred the debate over asymmetric dangers and risks, was introduced for the first time in NATO's rhetoric in 1981. The first report on a Ministerial level pertinent to terrorist acts and the abhorrence that such actions produce to the Alliance appears in the NATO's

²⁰⁶ For further analysis and more elaboration on the issues of allied interoperability that rose during the operations of Afghanistan and the Arabian Sea see for example John Brosky, "It takes two to interoperate," *Journal of Electronic Defense*, 25 Aug (2002).

²⁰⁷ Seven countries were invited to "to begin accession talks to join [the] Alliance." See NATO, *Prague Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague on 21 November 2002* [Internet] (2002, accessed 9/28 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>.

²⁰⁸ The purpose of the NRF will be to provide NATO with a robust, state-of-the-art and credible joint combined force, which will be able to deploy rapidly wherever needed and undertake the full spectrum of the Alliance's operations. For further details see NATO-SHAPE, *The NATO Response Force – NRF* [Internet] (2002, accessed 9/28 2004); available from http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/nrf_intro.htm.

rhetoric with the "Declaration on Terrorism" of December 10, 1981.²⁰⁹ Furthermore, the NAC meeting of 1982 at a "Heads of State and Government" level issued a NAC communiqué (The Bonn Declaration) which in paragraph 7 focusing on "international terrorism" reads:

We condemn all acts of international terrorism. They constitute flagrant violations of human dignity and rights and are a threat to the conduct of normal international relations. In accordance with our national legislation, we stress the need for the most effective cooperation possible to prevent and suppress this scourge.²¹⁰

In the 1980s, the Alliance identified the "scourge" of terrorism which was addressed chiefly with domestic policies. Judicial institutions and domestic civil authorities were those responsible and constitutionally appointed to fight against terrorism. This was the Allied policy on terrorism at the time.

The September 11, 2001, attacks provided new grounds to clear the uncertainties of Allied policies, as to the extent of Allied action, the form that such action should take, and the exploitation of the mechanisms in place to reach the desired consensus. It is evident that the Alliance is changing, and it is transforming its roles to counter threats in the global context. In other words, it goes out-of-area. The "potential risks" that the Alliance contemplated in the 1999 Strategic Concept are all stemming from the outside, from out-of-

²⁰⁹ North Atlantic Council, *Declaration On Terrorism* [Internet] (NATO, 1981, accessed 10/16 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c811210b.htm>. This declaration is the first published online document in which NATO officially deals with terrorism. During 1981, a series of terrorist acts occurred spawned by the anti NATO and anti American feeling in W. Germany stemming from the protests of extreme leftist terrorist groups with the most prominent being the Baader Mainhof. These groups "opposed the stationing medium-range missiles in Western Europe and the U.S. decision to build neutron weapons." The culmination of these acts was the terrorist attack at the U.S. Air Force Base at Ramstein, in August 31, 1981, claimed by the Baader Mainhof a.k.a. the Red Army faction. See also U.S. Department of State - International Information Programs, *Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1961-2001: A Chronology* [Internet] (U.S. Department of State, 10/15/2004 2001, accessed 9/28 2004); available from http://usinfo.state.gov/is/international_security/terrorism/terror_chronology.html. For further information concerning the attacks at the former W. Germany see: *United Press International*, Ramstein Air Base Terrorist Bomb, PM cycle [Internet] (*United Press International*, 1981, accessed 10/24 2004); available from www.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=0e126bf5c1d4e941afb36cbe7d4ba3db&_docnum=15&wchp=d_GLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=6a7e11458b162f0cad0ce1eacfa7e5 and Bradley Graham, "Attacks Continue in Germany," *The Washington Post*, 9/2/1981 1981.

²¹⁰ North Atlantic Council, *Declaration of the Heads of State and Government* (The Bonn Declaration) [Internet] (NATO, 1982, accessed 10/16 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c820610a.htm>.

area, and their repercussions are evident on the internal stability of the Allied nations. NATO has contributed heavily in restoring and preserving the strategic balance in Europe. That balance has acquired new impetus through the NATO expansion and the promotion of the NATO-Russian relationship.

Allied nations and the Alliance in general are greatly affected by strategies and actions stemming outside of the Euro-Atlantic region and, as experience has shown, when non-actors are involved, they pose a greater danger, since they constitute intangible threats. NATO has been severely affected by the attacks of September 11. But the analysis would be inconclusive if it failed to provide an answer as to what actions (or lack thereof) the Alliance had undertaken to preserve the unity and the cohesion of the institution. In this manner, it is logical to examine the course of events and estimate their weight in the transatlantic process. The Washington Treaty and Article 5, in particular, articulate clear commitments for each and every one of the Allies. It also provides great margins as to how each one of the Allies will contribute to the collective defense in case of an attack. Moreover, it does not provide a quantitative measurement of the contributing actions of the individual Allies. Thus every action is presupposed to be of equal weight. This was perhaps the rationale that was at the back of the mind of Lord Robertson when he made the statement that Article 5 invocation actually provided the U.S. with a "switch." It is clear that the Alliance in the case of the September 11 incident reached consensus in a short period of time and with no second thoughts. The invocation of Article 5, due to an attack against the most powerful ally, may appear to have had a mainly symbolic meaning, but this underestimates the importance of the action. What really undervalues its significance is how the *primus inter pares* decided to utilize the offering and the subsequent rhetoric involved. When the U.S. decided to engage in operations in Afghanistan, the Allies offered their assistance, but at some point even those with substantial assets in the theater were considered of secondary importance. As Lawrence Kaplan points out

American misgivings about European interference in the conduct of the war were misplaced. Although their contributions were too modest to permit the North Atlantic Council the

authority it was able to exercise in the Kosovo campaign, the Allies filled gaps in equipment and personnel that Americans appreciated. The support they [the Allies] extended to the United States in the wake of the first American missile attacks against the Taliban on 4 November [2001] was consistent with the earlier dispatch of NATO AWACS to patrol the Atlantic coast.²¹¹

Moreover, the invocation of Article 5 served to bolster the exchange of information and intelligence, an aspect of the multifaceted consultation process; NATO after the attacks set forth as a top priority the "...enhanced sharing of information among the Allies on threat warnings and intelligence ..."²¹² One can plausibly argue that the U.S. could have undertaken the Afghanistan campaign aggregating in their power the contributions of the Allies without the latter posing any inhibition to the conduct of operations. However, allied assets:

...did provide a variety direct and indirect support in both the campaign in Afghanistan and in the larger counter terrorism effort.

The deployment of Alliance resources, including AWACS aircraft in the United States, special forces units in Afghanistan and the naval deployments to the Mediterranean and Arabian Sea, did significantly bolster the ability of the Bush Administration to conduct Operation Enduring Freedom. NATO actions both increased the capability of the coalition and freed up American resources for use in Afghanistan. NATO's military support and combat actions were facilitated by the high degree of interoperability within the Alliance. This allowed for both close cooperation during the combat operations in Afghanistan and in the naval mission in the Arabian Sea.²¹³

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²¹¹ Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance*, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2004), 138.

²¹² NATO *Statement on combating terrorism: Adapting the Alliance's Defence Capabilities*, [Internet] (2001, accessed 9/28 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-173e.htm>.

²¹³ Tom Lansford, *All for one: terrorism, NATO and the United States*, (Burlington, VT.: Ashgate, 2002), 126.

up American resources for use in Afghanistan. NATO's military support and combat actions were facilitated by the high degree of interoperability within the Alliance. This allowed for both close cooperation during the combat operations in Afghanistan and in the naval mission in the Arabian Sea.²¹⁴

In addition, NATO by November 2002 was "poised to start playing its first official role in Afghanistan after Germany and the Netherlands asked the US-led military alliance to provide assistance when they jointly take over the lead of the international forces in Kabul early next year [2003]."²¹⁵

Since the deployment of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to Afghanistan in January 2002, it has been under the command of NATO members, first the United Kingdom followed by Turkey. During the next period, when it was under the command of Germany and the Netherlands, NATO Allies provided 95% of the personnel in ISAF III. On 11 August 2003, NATO took over command of ISAF and is since then responsible for its coordination and planning. *This is NATO's first operation outside the Euro-Atlantic area.*²¹⁶

The case for Iraq however, stands in stark contrast to that of Afghanistan operations. This is not only due to the disputes that have risen pertinent to the legitimacy of the invasion, but also on the ways the issue was politically handled. Notwithstanding the fact that there is not enough conclusive and concrete evidence but only presumptive evidence, one can safely assume that there was lack of consultation inside the Alliance on the issue of Iraq. Instead of consultation, there was abundant information on the part of the U.S. Indirect but indicative evidence can be cited by accounting the consultation and the way this is conducted by the Secretary of State. As Ivo Daalder points out: "...Powell spends considerable time on the telephone with his European counterparts. But the quick phone call is more useful for delivering a demarche than gaining a true understanding of what it might take

²¹⁴ Tom Lansford, *All for one: terrorism, NATO and the United States*, (Burlington, VT.: Ashgate, 2002), 126.

²¹⁵ Judy Dempsey, "NATO poised to take role in Kabul Security," *Financial Times* (London), 11/12/2002 2002.

²¹⁶ NATO, *NATO's contribution to the fight against terrorism* [Internet] (10/13/2004 2002, accessed 10/24 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/terrorism/>. (emphasis mine).

to arrive at a common position.”²¹⁷ This issue (the lack of consultation by personal contact) has also been brought up at the hearings of Committee of the U.S. House, and the testimony given by Assistant Secretary of State Jones in confirming that “Secretary Powell is on the phone”²¹⁸ with his “European colleagues.” Moreover she also confirms

But I can't sit here and tell you [the members of the Subcommittee on Europe] that we [Americans] are always going to shift to do whatever anybody else wants us to do. That isn't going to happen. But we do listen, and we try to take into consideration.²¹⁹

The above extract exhibits two fundamental premises: a) the perceptions of the U.S. administration that someone, in this case the Europeans, is trying to shift its policies; b) the determination that this [shift] will not always happen. Pertinent to NATO, it should be noted that the “consultation norm [which is implicitly referred to by the statement of the Assistant Secretary] is codified and institutionalized in various NATO arrangements. Specific obligations prescribe consultation procedures in particular circumstances and related to specific issues.”²²⁰ In other words, when a member nation in NATO decides to consult it must be determined to present its arguments and “where common interests of the Atlantic Community are at stake, consultation should always seek to arrive at timely agreement on common lines of policy and action.”²²¹ If an ally does not wish to consult and merely informs the Alliance of its decisions, this does not entail an automatic consensus. Elaborate deliberations among the member states of an Alliance always involve the likelihood of a necessary “shift” in order to

²¹⁷ Ivo H. Daalder, “The End of Atlanticism,” *Survival*, 45 Jun 1 (2003): 154.

²¹⁸ United States. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Europe, U.S. And Europe: *The Bush Administration And Transatlantic Relations* (U.S. G.P.O.: Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O. [Congressional Sales Office], 2002, accessed 10/24 2004); available from http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intrel/hfa78204.000/hfa78204_of.htm.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 17.

²²⁰ Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence On U.S. Foreign Policy*, Princeton studies in international history and politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), 36.

²²¹ Extract from the report by the Committee of the three (a.k.a. the three Wise Men) cited at Harlan Cleveland, *NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain*, [1st ed. (New York,: Harper & Row, 1970), 15.

reach consensus. If consensus on a particular issue is not important for a member state, but its unilateral actions have an impact on the other members, this most certainly will lead to a crisis, as the experiences of Suez and the 1973 War illustrate. In such a case it is reasonable for the Allies to proceed to subsequent motions expressing that the "...general feeling [is] that Washington does not consult with the European Allies in the relationship of the war on terrorism ..."²²²

In the case of Iraq, it has been strongly argued that the September 11th incident gave the pretext for the U.S. administration to focus on it shortly after major operations in Afghanistan came to an end, a fact that was known in NATO.²²³ Moreover, as further evidence for the lack of consultation among the Allies and the U.S. becomes clear, one can argue that there is no indication of prior planning in NATO pertinent to the Iraq issue. This is advocated by at least two facts: first, Secretary Powell sent a letter in November 2002 to some 50 countries asking them for contributions to the then imminent war in Iraq.²²⁴ Second, "[o]n January 15, 2003, the United States formally requested that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) begin planning to defend one of its members, Turkey, from any counterstrikes launched by Iraq in the event of a war with Iraq. France, Germany, and Belgium, concerned that such a move by NATO would send a message that

²²² United States. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Europe, U.S. And Europe: *The Bush Administration And Transatlantic Relations* (U.S. G.P.O. : For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O. [Congressional Sales Office], 2002, accessed 10/24 2004); available from http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa78204.000/hfa78204_of.htm.

²²³ Judy Dempsey, "US rallies NATO Allies for global war on terrorism," *Financial Times*, 9/21/2001, 2001. "...However, another Nato diplomat expressing concern about the direction of the US response said: "If the US bombs bin Laden in Afghanistan, depending on the outcome, it may take it further - into Iraq." Another NATO diplomat noted that for some in the US administration, 'this is still unfinished business 10 years after Bush's father drove Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait'..." Moreover the 9/11 Commission report provides further evidence on the preoccupation of some members of the administration like Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, Assistant Secretary Wolfowitz, and even the President himself with an attack to Iraq using as a pretext the 9/11 attacks. For further details see National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States., Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton, *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*, Official government ed. (Washington, DC: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States: Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O., 2004), 334-338.

²²⁴ Judy Dempsey, "Allies offer bases, troops and airspace," *Financial Times*, 11/22/2002 2002.

war with Iraq was inevitable, resisted the request.”²²⁵ Despite the fact that eventually the protective measures for Turkey were taken, the U.S. initiative clearly adds up to the other relevant evidence that for the U.S. the war was inevitable, and that the Allies, since most of them were reluctant to endorse it, were merely informed. However, as already stated above, consultation is not the process of information; once more the three Wise Men offer their expert recommendation:

[T]he essential thing is that on all occasions and in all circumstances, member governments, before acting or even before pronouncing, should keep the interests and the requirements of the Alliance in mind...A member government should not without adequate advance consultation, adopt firm policies or make major political pronouncements on, matters which significantly affect the Alliance or any of its members, unless circumstances make such prior consultation obviously and demonstrably impossible.²²⁶

Due to the fundamental differences between the U.S. and most of the NATO Allies on the issue of Iraq’s invasion and occupation it is unlikely that the rift of opinion could have been bridged with patient and persistent diplomacy. The U.S. administration was heavily preoccupied with the issue and there were no margins for effective consultation with the Allies. The issue of Iraq presented a challenge for the Alliance, which was severely divided over it. One of the aspects of the crisis was “the obvious impossibility of assembly [of] a global coalition like that of 1991;”²²⁷ the U.S. side was aware of this reality and thus opted for an ad-hoc, more flexible coalition, since the rest of the world and the majority of NATO Allies, in particular, had a fundamentally different picture of the conditions in Iraq. The U.S.

²²⁵ Aaron D Lindstrom, "Consensus Decisionmaking in NATO: French Unilateralism and the Decision to Defend Turkey," *Chicago Journal of International Law*, 4 Fall (2003): 579.

²²⁶ G. Martino, H. Lange, and L. Pearson, *Text of the Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO* (NAC Dec. 13, 1956) [Internet] (1956, accessed 9/28 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/bt-a3.htm>.

²²⁷ Interview of the author with Thesis Co-Advisor, Professor D. J. Moran, at the Naval Postgraduate Scholl, Monterey, CA. 10/27/2004.

administration was firmly determined “and was not going to be talked out of it, [over Iraq] even by more skilful and patient diplomacy.”²²⁸

E. CONCLUSION

NATO has a long history of adaptations, internal readjustments and transformations. Two of the former were conducted in a relatively short period accounting for the size and the politico-military implications and considerations of the Alliance. The cohesive bond provided by the primordial enemy that the Warsaw Pact presented came into being in a more assertive manner after the brutal attacks of the 11 September, 2001. NATO was there and declared its solidarity and willingness to apply common policies and strategies aimed at the elimination of the new enemy. However, different policies and approaches, as well as dissimilar opinions stemming from divergent interests and personal perceptions created a rift among the partners of the Alliance. Assertive rhetoric came from both sides of the Atlantic to exacerbate the cleavage. Moreover, as this chapter has shown, the pattern of out-of-area issues with lack of adequate consultation, in conjunction with predetermined actions is the basic foundation for the observed crisis. The Europeans were supportive during the Afghanistan campaign, not only because they felt obliged to respond, but also because their security was endangered too by international terror, and it was in their national interest to eliminate the threat.

For an outside observer, the invocation of Article 5 was to provide the Alliance with more cohesion and assertion of actions. Nonetheless, unilateral actions based on erroneous or at least incomplete intelligence created a more-or-less “undesirable” situation for both the European partners and the U.S. The consultation machinery however, is still in place and provides all the necessary means to overcome the rift created; the only prerequisite is to use it and let others, in good will, express their concerns, which should be taken

²²⁸ Interview of the author with Thesis Co-Advisor, Professor D. J. Moran, at the Naval Postgraduate Scholl, Monterey, CA. 10/27/2004.

under consideration. Moreover, the U.S., as the only superpower, conscious of its preponderance and superiority should consider what Dean Rusk used to say apropos, that the U.S. is:

...the 'fat boy in the canoe.' When we shift our weight it makes a disproportionate difference. The fat boy has been shifting his weight a lot lately, often without much notice to the other passengers. And the boat we share with our European Allies is taking on dangerous amounts of water.²²⁹

²²⁹ Harlan Cleveland, *Harlan Cleveland Commenting from Washington* [Internet] (2003, accessed 10/24 2004); available from <http://www.worldpaper.com/2003/march03/iraq7.html>.

V. CONCLUSION

NATO is the most firmly structured and fully institutionalized Alliance of contemporary times. While only a portion of the national forces of each ally is disposed to NATO, the aggregate power of the allied nations is unprecedented in world history.

NATO's utility has been questioned since the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Nonetheless, one can argue that NATO is more than an ordinary military Alliance. During the Cold War it served to foster the necessary cohesion among the European states and eliminate the fundamental causes that had devastated the continent, keeping the U.S. involved. However, during contemporary times, stability in the Euro-Atlantic area is more or less secured. Despite the fact that there are frictions and a subtle potential danger of "local eruptions," European security and defense can be considered to be consolidated and NATO is one of the cornerstones of this premise. Moreover, NATO serves as bridge for the transatlantic link, since notwithstanding the fact that U.S. and European cultures differ, "security is indivisible" and there is more than enough room for understanding between the two pillars of the Alliance.

The North Atlantic Treaty and its stipulations remain current as they were when in 1949. The three articles examined in this study are explicitly referred in NATO's strategic concept of 1999:

Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organized crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability affecting the Alliance. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington

Treaty and, where appropriate, co-ordination of their efforts including their responses to risks of this kind.²³⁰

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is and will remain the crux of the Alliance. The meaning of this Article was originally defined by the persistent hostility of the Soviet Union in the Euro-Atlantic region. Out-of-area issues during the Cold War era were, by and large, exceptions to the rules. They were caused by unilateral policies of the Allies, or instigated by policies of the Soviet Union outside Europe, to which one or more Allies responded. Considering the consolidation of stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, future challenges will most likely come from abroad.

The consultation clause of the North Atlantic Treaty is restated in the above extract as a fundamental process inside the Alliance, leading to better understanding among the member nations and thus more effective action. Hence the politico-military consultation and cooperation entailed in Article 4 acquires greater importance. At times the obligation to consult and be consulted becomes implicitly imperative. In other words, where in the past Article 5 was “standing out” in itself, today and for the future its importance is considered *de facto*; emphasis is to be placed on the politico-military consultation among the Allies.

In this view the Europeans should develop policies to close the capabilities gap. One source of cohesion in an Alliance stems from the ability of the Allies to interoperate, not only rhetorically, but also on more tangible terms like military capabilities. Moreover, the U.S. on the other hand, should take under consideration the different political culture of the European nations and reconfirm its ability to confer with its Allies and reach common political decisions. Hesitations based on public opinion anxieties and political cost calculations can sometimes inflict greater damage than military operations

²³⁰ North Atlantic Council, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept* [Internet] (NAC, 4/23/1999 1999, accessed 9/28 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>.

themselves. As Eleftherios Venizelos has noted, "...when public opinion [is] not favorable, I tend to educate it and not to be influenced by it."²³¹

NATO has to be a part of the history of the future and thus the Allies should recollect that the past offers valuable teachings for the future. As NATO's first Secretary General, Lord Ismay pointed out vividly fifty years ago:

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is entering upon a new phase which should demonstrate once again its adaptability to change and its capacity for progress.

...Our community of free nations, with interests to many parts of the world is bound to be constantly faced with new problems requiring new solutions. Indeed, we in NATO will need for years to come, a great deal of imagination and energy in order to develop by collective action the defensive power of our Alliance and to tighten in all fields the bonds between member states on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.²³²

²³¹ Studies of Venizelos and his era, ed. Dimitrakopoulos, *Odysseas*, vol. 1 (Athens Greece: Philippotis, 1980), as quoted in Anastasiadou, "*Venizelos and the Greek-Turkish Friendship Treaty of 1930*," 384. Translation by the author.

²³² Lord Ismay, *The First Five Years 1952-1957* [Internet] (2001, accessed 10/11 2004); available from <http://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/chapters/14.htm>.

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